You Can’t Touch Me! — Sovereign Citizens and the Jurisdictional Gambit: 23 Misquoted Cases…

I

Sovereign Citizens and the Jurisdictional Gambit:
You Can’t Touch Me!

Shortlink to this blog: https://wp.me/p3nYC8-1q5

Since they refuse to adhere to the law unless they feel like it, sovereigns are often found in courtrooms as defendants. Indeed there is a class or group of sovereigns who adopt the ideology because they are already criminals who don’t want to be responsible for their actions and a religious — err, political theory that says they can’t be held responsible unless they agree seems pretty attractive!

One primary tactic when in court is to challenge the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case against the sovereign citizen. One reason they refuse to enter the courtroom or the railed off portion (the bar) is because their mythology says to do so makes them agree to a contract to be citizens or at least to subject themselves to the Court.

Sovereigns believe they are not subject to the law or the authority of the court unless they agree, so this would be a good strategy if that were true. Of course it is not, the courts readily assert jurisdiction given to them by their legislature over certain kinds of cases (subject matter jurisdiction) over any person at all (person among other things meaning “human being” [Black’s Law, 10th Ed.]) who is within their territorial jurisdiction (in personam jurisdiction) or for an offense or infraction committed therein.

(In fact if they really were not subject to the Court they wouldn’t appear at all…but they know the police or other authority will be looking for them and will arrest them. Since sovereignty  has as a salient point the ability to exercise control that is enough in my mind to show they don’t have it and the courts do…)

So there is quite a lot of talk about jurisdiction on the Internet School of Sovereign Citizen Law (no, it doesn’t exist but many seem to be graduates nevertheless…)

So on a YouTube video where there was some yammering about jurisdiction in researching answers I found the document below, an amazing one at that. Amazingly wrong.

This is correct in that jurisdiction is fundamental and if a court doesn’t have jurisdiction it cannot render a valid verdict or judgment in a case.

But they insist that the instant they challenge jurisdiction everything must stop until there is absolute proof of jurisdiction. In fact they often claim that the case cannot even start until jurisdiction is proven and since in their mind it doesn’t exist, they can’t even be talked to by the court about it… And of course once the court overrules the objection and finds that it has jurisdiction they tend to keep arguing about it anyway and so end up in contempt of court…

If jurisdiction is apparent, the court proceeds. If it is challenged the party maintaining that jurisdiction applies must provide proof of that. Not proof beyond all doubt. Not here and now but at the Court’s timing. And it is the Courts decision whether it has jurisdiction,.

Anyway that leads us to this document which like so many makes the rounds of the Sov sites, is cut and pasted and never ever read or verified (ok I exaggerate a few places actually do look at these things…but not many).

It is illustrative that there are erroneous citations such as “Latana” instead of “Lantana” that appear over and over on the sites that purvey this stuff that is a clue that they didn’t every actually check the cite.

So I read “23 cases” and we find maybe 19 cases, there are two repeats which demonstrate someone didn’t even do a basic proof-read; and some “not cases.”

And we find about 20 misquotes. Yes, nearly every single one of these is actually a misquotation of the case, sometimes substantial sometimes not; sometimes it’s a good paraphrase but it’s not a quote and accuracy matters; sometimes I couldn’t tell what the case really said about jurisdiction because I didn’t want to read them all in their entirety.

So I tried searching them for the words in the document in quote marks. And they weren’t there. Sorry they just weren’t there.

Apparently quote marks mean something else to sovereign legal scholars than to me, because they were not quotations found in the cited opinions almost every single time.

 

How to Beat Any Court Case – National Liberty Alliance

“The National Liberty Alliance (NLA) is a proactive organization. You must do your homework, study the law, and be willing to put in the effort and time for your own paperwork. We DO NOT provide legal advice in anyway. If you do not want to learn the law and you want someone else to do the work for you, then you should consider other options than those on this site. But, if you want to help us stop judges and attorneys from stealing children, homes, and money from the people, then join us and register. If these things have happen to you, rest assured you are not alone. Many of our members have had children stolen, homes robbed, and many other injustices happen to them. Please make sure to signup so we can all make a difference.”

“23 Case Citations”

  1. A court may not render a judgment which transcends the limits of its authority, and a judgment is void if it is beyond the powers granted to the court by the law of its organization, even where the court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Thus, if a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void.

Without any source, I offer no opinion on the assertion.

  1. The lack of statutory authority to make particular order or a judgment is akin to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and is subject to collateral attack. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments § 25, pp. 388-89.

I don’t have access to this encyclopedia, which is not a legal authority. It’s an encyclopedia that collects decisions for ease of research. The opinions are what the law says, not the encyclopedia itself.

  1. “A void judgment is to be distinguished from an erroneous one, in that the latter is subject only to direct attack. A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect.”
    Lubben v. Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972)

That Quote is actually correct! The First of Almost No Others…

But they Omitted something:

“A court has the power to determine its own jurisdiction, and an error in that determination will not render the judgment void. Only in the rare instance of a clear usurpation of power will a judgment be rendered void.”

Wow they are gonna hate that one! No wonder they didn’t include it!

4. “A judgment rendered by a court without personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void. It is a nullity. [A judgment shown to be void for lack of personal service on the defendant is a nullity.]”
Sramek v. Sramek,
17 Kan. App. 2d 573, 576-77, 840 P.2d 553 (1992), rev. denied 252 Kan. 1093 (1993).

The words reported do not appear in the case cited.
Correct Quote:
“A judgment is void if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the parties, or if its actions resulted in a denial of due process.” 9 Kan. App. 2d 735, Syl. ¶ 5. “A judgment that is void for lack of due process may be set aside at any time.” 9 Kan. App. 2d 735, Syl. ¶ 6. “Further, knowledge of the pendency of an action has no effect on a void judgment.” 9 Kan. App. 2d at 744.

  1. “Where there are no depositions, admissions, or affidavits the court has no facts to rely on for a summary determination.”
    Trinsey v. Pagliaro, D.C. Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647.

The words quoted do not appear in the case cited.

Correct Quote: The defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim unsupported by affidavits or depositions is incomplete because it requests this Court to consider facts outside the record which have not been presented in the form required by Rules 12(b) (6) and 56(c). Statements of counsel in their briefs or argument while enlightening to the Court are not sufficient for purposes of granting a motion to dismiss or summary judgment.

Comment: Note this “quote” turned a request to dismiss based on no evidence into a challenge to jurisdiction for lack of evidence. This is dishonest use of the case as well as incorrectly quoting it.

  1. “A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. It is clear and well established law that a void order can be challenged in any court”,
    OLD WAYNE MUT. L. ASSOC. v. McDONOUGH, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907).

The words quoted do not appear in the case cited.

  1. “The law is well-settled that a void order or judgement is void even before reversal”, VALLEY v. NORTHERN FIRE & MARINE INS. CO., 254 u.s. 348, 41 S. Ct. 116 ( 1920 )

The words quoted do not appear in the case cited.

8. “Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgements and orders are regarded as nullities ; they are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.”
WILLIAMSON v. BERRY, 8 HOW. 945, 540 12 L. Ed. 1170, 1189 ( 1850 ).

The words quoted do not appear in the case cited.

9. “Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but rather should dismiss the action.”
Melo v. U.S. 505 F 2d 1026.

The words quoted do not appear in the case cited.
CORRECT quote:
The trial court, by reason of plaintiff’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, acquired no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. When it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach the merits. In such a situation the action should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Comment: Note that this doesn’t say “everything must stop immediately”. In fact the court may take some time to determine whether it has jurisdiction, may pursue other matters until it does.

10. “There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction.”
Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 215.

The words quoted do not appear in the case cited.
CORRECT Quote:
Although it is regrettable that the Government did not raise the FECA issue more promptly, once that issue was raised, the district court had no discretion to proceed to a final adjudication of the cause of action without first requiring the plaintiff to complete the processing of his administrative claim under the FECA. Where there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter, there is, as well, no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction.
(Understand, I don’t really take issue with that particular opinion, the Courts are not allowed to ignore jurisdictional questions that are real. But it’s not stated that way in the case

11. “The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction.”
Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416.

The words quoted do not appear in the case cited.
Corrected Quote:
Generally, a plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdiction are sufficient, but when they are questioned, as in this case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction.

  1. “Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted.”
    Latana [sic]* v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York 37 F Supp. 150.
    (Town Of Lantana, Fla. V. Hopper)

*Erroneous citation copied over and over and over from sovereign citizen sites without anyone finding the error because no one reads the cases, just copies them.

The words quoted do not appear in the case cited.
Correct Quote:
The above cited decisions and authorities cited therein conclusively establish the rule that if the issue is presented in any way the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon him who invokes it. Since plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proving jurisdiction, there was nothing for the District Court to do but dismiss the cause.

13. “The law provides that once State and Federal Jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven.” 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).

APPARENTLY this is State of MAINE et al., Petitioners, v. Joline THIBOUTOT, et vir., etc.  448 U.S. 1 (100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555)

The words quoted do not appear in the case I found, that may or may not be the case intended.  Erroneous citation – no name to the case.

  1. “Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time.”
    Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. 495 F 2d 906, 910.

The words quoted do not appear in the case cited.
Correct Quote:
A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking. Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963). The party invoking the jurisdiction of the court has the duty to establish that federal jurisdiction does exist, Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969)….Therefore, lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived and jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a federal court by consent, inaction or stipulation. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972);

Comment: Once again, this doesn’t say “STOP ALL PROCEEDINGS” it says that when the court decides it lacks jurisdiction it should dismiss the case. Not when the Sovereign Defendant insists that it lacks jurisdiction. And it is the Court that makes the decision, based on whatever it feels is proper evidence of jurisdiction.

  1. “Defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, even on appeal.”
    Hill Top Developers v. Holiday Pines Service Corp. 478 So. 2d. 368 (Fla 2nd DCA 1985).

The words quoted do not appear in the case cited.
Correct Quote:
The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may properly be raised for the first time at the appellate stage. Rodriquez v. State, 441 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

Comment OK the quote isn’t wrong, it is however NOT A QUOTE it’s a paraphrase, a restatement. In legal matters words matter, a correct quote is much better than a restatement because in the restatement something can be added or lost.
Learn how to do real legal research and how to use quote marks!

  1. “Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted. ”
    Lantana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York, 37 F. Supp. 150.

See #12, same case but this time correctly captioned; same quote previously offered; the quoted words are still not in that opinion.

Comment: The Court is not obliged to prove jurisdiction, it finds it has it or it does not based on the facts, pleading, allegations, affidavits, or evidence before it; or it places the burden on one of the parties to allege the facts that give it jurisdiction; and if challenged the party obliged must offer such proof as in the court’s mind establishes jurisdiction. Normally a plaintiff or complainant will include a statement as to the court’s jurisdiction in its original filing.

  1. “Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proved to exist.”
    Stuck v. Medical Examiners 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389.

As seems to always be the case in this document, the quoted words are not found in the opinion of the court.  Rather than being a paraphrase of something in the opinion, or a derivative opinion as to what the court’s statements mean, which is often the case in this document, the quote seems to be made up completely.

Correct Quote:
”…as the board is a tribunal of special jurisdiction the accusation should set forth its jurisdiction. The accusation in this proceeding sets forth facts showing the board’s jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person of Dr. Stuck.”

  1. “Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided.”
    Maine v Thiboutot 100 S. Ct. 250.Correct Citation (probably:) State of MAINE et al., Petitioners, v. Joline THIBOUTOT, et vir., etc.  448 U.S. 1 (100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555)

Comment: Maybe they missed #13 which is the same case and the same quote. Lack of proofreading doesn’t inspire confidence. The words quoted STILL do not appear in the case cited if this is that case.

  1. “The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings.”
    Hagans v Lavine 415 U. S. 533.


The quoted words do not exist in the case cited.
Correct Quote (in footnote 2/5) 
“Whether an objection that a bill or a complaint fails to state a case under a federal statute raises a question of jurisdiction or of merits is to be determined by the application of a well settled rule. If the bill or the complaint sets forth a substantial claim, a case is presented within the federal jurisdiction, however the court, upon consideration, may decide as to the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged to support the claim. But jurisdiction, as distinguished from merits, is wanting where the claim set forth in the pleading is plainly unsubstantial. The cases have stated the rule in a variety of ways, but all to that effect. . . . And the federal question averred may be plainly unsubstantial either because obviously without merit or because its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.”

Comment: I regret the repetition but searching this case for “administrative agency” or “proof of jurisdiction” or “administrative proceedings” yields nothing.

  1. A judgment obtained without jurisdiction over the defendant is void.
    Overby v. Overby , 457 S.W.2d 851 (Tenn. 1970). Volume 20: Corpus Juris Sec. § 1785.

Correct Quote: “That a judgment in personam against a defendant who is not before the court either by service of process or by the entry of appearance is void there can be no question.”

Comment: REALLY. Again.
Does the writer of this document understand the meaning of a quotation mark?.

  1. Challenge to court’s jurisdiction is raised by motion to dismiss,
    Criterion Co. v. State, 458 So. 2d. 22 (Fla 1st DCA 1984.)
    CRITERION INSURANCE COMPANY v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

Correct Quote: “The [Florida] Department [of Insurance] in effect challenged the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, a challenge which is properly raised by motion to dismiss. See Fla.R. *26 Civ.P. 1.140(b). The only ground on which the court could have considered the suit was as to the claims directed to the facial constitutionality of the statute.”

  1. Since jurisdiction is fundamental, and it is jurisdiction alone that gives a court power to hear, determine, and pronounce judgment on the issues before it, jurisdiction must be continuing in the court throughout the proceedings,
    Re. Cavitt, 254 P.599d
    Correct Citation: In Re Cavitt 47 Cal.App.2d 698118 P.2d 846

Correct Quote: Jurisdiction is fundamental, and as heretofore pointed out, must be continuing in the court throughout the proceeding, because it is jurisdiction alone that gives the court power to hear, determine and pronounce judgment upon the issues before it.”

Comment: Of course the Quote is like so many before,incorrect.

  1. Since jurisdiction is fundamental to any valid judicial proceeding, the first question that must be determined by a trial court in any case is that of jurisdiction, Dillon v. Dillon, 187 P,27.

Correct Quote: It is elementary that the first question which must be determined by the trial court in every case is that of jurisdiction. (Clary v. Hoagland, 6 Cal. 685) 

Comment: Was that so hard? Once again, the quote is not found within the opinion cited but at least this one comes close.

OK what did we learn?

1. Sovereign Citizens have no idea how to do legal research, and don’t read the cases they cite, they just copy and paste them over and over and over.

They don’t seem to proofread either.

2. They apparently don’t understand how to use quotation marks. If you made up the words you can’t put them in quote marks.

3. They make a huge hullabaloo about things but when you look at the real law it doesn’t.

In fact it is quite rare for a court to entertain a case where it lacks jurisdiction but if it does it dismisses. The sovs will imply that it happens every single time, because their thesis is that the government has no authority over them, well surely the courts don’t either. They expect the courts to somehow agree. There is no evidence that the courts do agree and no written opinion (indeed many to the opposite effect) says that anyone is exempt from the law or can choose not to be subject to the government or court jurisdiction.

4. In fact the courts agree; the sovereigns ARE subject to the laws with our without consent and ARE subject to the court’s jurisdiction:

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) [US Supreme Court]

“The several States of the Union …except as restrained and limited by [the Constitution], …possess and exercise the authority of independent States, … every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.“

United States v. Kenneth Wayne Leaming, (WD Washington D.C.) Order, docket entry 102, 2/12/2013, [District Court] [Order of dismissal does not include this cited Order.]

“The Court therefore feels some measure of responsibility to inform Defendant that all the fancy legal-sounding ‘things he has read on the internet’ are make-believe. … at the end of the day, while sovereign citizens and Defendant cite things like ‘Universal Law Ordinances,’… they are subject to both state and federal laws, just like everyone else.” (emphasis in original)

 

=                                       More Blogs by Philipem 1000                                       =

Sovereign Citizens and Fellow Travelers
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fD

=                                                          The Law                                                          =
Sources Of Law and Authority
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fF

Are Statutes Laws?  What About Regulations ?
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-Od

Strawman Theory and CAPITAL Letters
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-TB

A collection of court cases
  quoted regularly in response to sovereign citizen

ideas and challenges to the driver license laws..
.

=                                                  The US and the States                                                =

Do You Need a License to Drive ?
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-mI

The United States Is A Corporation

(Or If You Prefer, It Can Be An Elephant )
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fK

The US Became Bankrupt in 1933 &

Federal Reserve Notes are Not Legal Currency
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fO

The United States is still a British Colony
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-kz

There are Three United States
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fX

=                                                 The Courts                                                     =

A Lost 13th Amendment
Removes all Legitimacy from Courts

http://wp.me/p3nYC8-kI

All US Courts hear only Admiralty Cases
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fV

US Courts are Administrative, Not Judicial
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fR

All Lawyers take a Secret Oath to Hide ‘The TRUTH
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-l2

Advertisements
Posted in Sovereign Citizen Crackpot Theories | Leave a comment

Court Cases In Support of Driver Licenses

This blog is a collection of court cases that I quote regularly in response to sovereign citizen ideas and to challenges to the driver license laws. These are listed by the level of court, then alphabetically by case.

My interpretations and comments are in this typeface and color; done to easily separate commentary from actual rulings.

International (Canada)

Meads v Meads 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII) [Canada]

This case covers virtually every aspect and claim of “Sovereign Citizens” as proffered under the Anglophile legal systems.

“[442]… {quoting. Justice Gauthier in Canada (Minister of National Revenue ‑ M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 (CanLII) at paras. 17, 27, 340 F.T.R. 150:} …The whole notion of their being a second capacity distinct from the one of a natural person or human being is a pure fiction, one which is not sanctioned by law. One can describe nothing in any terms one wishes; it still remains nothing.”

U. S. Federal Courts

Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473,1477 (9th Cir.1993) [Driving]

“On a Friday morning in 1987, Mrs. Hallstrom’s vehicle was stopped by an officer of the Garden City Police Department for a broken taillight. When she refused to show the officer her driver’s license or proof of liability insurance coverage, she was arrested. She told the officer that she did not believe Idaho law required her to carry a license, and that, in any event, requiring her to carry one violated her right to travel. …Mrs. Hallstrom erroneously argues that Idaho law does not require her to have a driver’s license as a condition of driving a motor vehicle in Idaho. To the contrary, Idaho law makes it a misdemeanor to drive a vehicle without a driver’s license. Operation of a motor vehicle is a “highly regulated activity, therefore the driver accepts the regulatory burden along with the benefit of using the public roads.” State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057, 1070 (1988). The laws requiring drivers to carry proof of insurance and registration are valid laws enacted by the state of Idaho.

“Because Mrs. Hallstrom … by her actions, demonstrated that she was likely to continue driving without a license, Officer Snapp did not violate her rights under Idaho law or the Constitution by making the arrest .”

Hendrick v. Maryland 235 US 610 (1915) [Driving]

It is important that before you disagree that you read the case. For example it is often asserted that the words “motor vehicle” means this is a commerce case. Not only is that not a proper definition of motor vehicle, but in reality the courts use automobile, motor vehicle, car, as interchangeable terms. 

Further in the facts of this case Hendrick was a private, non-commercial driver of a private automobile.

The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves… In the absence of national legislation covering the subject a State may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles — those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers… This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the States and essential to the preservation of the health, safety and comfort of their citizens….There is no solid foundation for the claim that the statute directly interferes with the rights of citizens of the United States to pass through the State,…here the statute at most attempts to regulate the operation of dangerous machines on the highways…

Hess v. Pawloski 274 US 352 (1927) [Sovereigns, Driving]

Facts of the case: … alleged that plaintiff negligently and wantonly drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Massachusetts and that by reason thereof the vehicle struck and injured defendant. Plaintiff is a resident of Pennsylvania. 

This case is a complex and really it’s about technicalities of serving a lawsuit against a person in another state. But in the process the court did rule on the requirement of such a person ‘traveling’ in Massachusetts to have a license or permission otherwise from the state to operate a vehicle there.

“The Supreme Judicial Court held the statute to be a valid exercise of the police power, and affirmed the order.”

“The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and, even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its highways.”

Kane v New Jersey 42 U.S. 160 (1916) [US Supreme Court] [Driving]

The power of a state to regulate the use of motor vehicles on its highways has been recently considered by this Court and broadly sustained. …As we there said “In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles — those moving in interstate commerce as well as others.”

Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116, 125 [US Supreme Court]

The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment….

If a citizen’s liberty to travel is to be regulated [by Congress], it must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of Congress, any delegation of the power must be subject to adequate standards, and such delegated authority will be narrowly construed.

The principles involved if applied to licensing drivers do not affect those licensing requirements. A license doesn’t violate due process. Since the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment would be at issue in a state case this precedent may not matter anyway.

Laine v. City of Livermore; Case No. 15-cv-03656-VC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016) [District Court] [Driving]

A very recent case, with an outright message as to the no license arguments.

“The constitutional right to travel does not create a constitutional right to drive. The state can require drivers to be licensed. The state can require drivers to be insured. The state can require drivers to register their cars. States don’t depend on the Commerce Clause for their authority to regulate private behavior, so it’s irrelevant whether drivers are traveling for business purposes or across state lines.

 

Matthew v. Honish, 233 F. App’x 563, 564 [7th Circuit Court 2007] [Driving]

Honish  a Wisconsin state trooper, stopped Dean in his “car.”
N
ote – Dean is clearly saying in his complaint that he was driving privately, and driving a “car” not an automobile, truck, motor vehicle, or conveyance in commerce. He made exactly the claims that we so often see made in YouTube videos and on blogs — he was “traveling, not driving,: and thus his arguement is that he was not required to have a license or register his vehicle. The court did not agree. 

“…after Honish stopped Dean in his car. In his complaint Dean claimed that the traffic stop violated his “right to travel” and provided no further details of the encounter. “

“Dean’s brief suggests that laws requiring state-supplied licenses to drive a car violate his “right to travel.” His brief includes copies of traffic citations for driving his car without a license, for failing to register his vehicle, and for using what he calls “private property identification plates,” as opposed to Wisconsin license plates. Dean claims that when Honish ticketed him for violating Wisconsin’s laws that required proper licensing and registration, Honish violated his constitutional right to travel.”

But Dean has not articulated reasons to support his unexplained argument that state licensure and registration requirements violate the right to travel. This is not surprising because such an argument is meritless. Miller v. Reed, (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that there is no “fundamental right to drive” and affirming dismissal of complaint based on state’s refusal to renew citizen’s driver’s license); Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no constitutional violation where valid Idaho law required driver’s license, and plaintiff was detained for not having one).

Without vehicle licenses, Dean is denied only “a single mode of transportation — in a car driven by himself,and this does not impermissibly burden his right to travel.”

“Accordingly, the district court’s judgment dismissing Dean’s case is AFFIRMED.”

Meister v. Moore 96 U.S. 76 (1877)[U.S. Supreme Court] [Driving]

This case has nothing directly to do with driving, in is from 1877, before automobiles were found on American roads. It is offered here because many claims are made that driving or travel are a “common law right.” Since those claimants misperceive the status of common law, which is simply case law made by the courts,  this case is offered to prove that it is subordinate to statutory laws and that the legislature can overrule such a common law right.

No doubt a statute may take away a common law right, but there is always a presumption that the legislature has no such intention unless it be plainly expressed.”

Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 [9th Circuit Court of Appeals 1999] [Driving]

Miller makes a more modest set of claims than many in his case against the California DMV. He claims a right to travel and that driving is a right that flows from the right to travel. He does not claim driving is commercial in fact he spends no time in the case discussion any distinction between the two. Driving is a mode of travel as far as he is concerned, but it is so important that it actually IS a right; the court agrees that driving is a way to travel. And it finds that requiring a license is not an intrusion on the right to travel, and there is no right to drive.

Please note the right to travel is a right to interstate travel and the question of intrastate travel would be left to the States.

The Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel.  Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986)… Instead, because Miller cannot legally drive a car unless his driver’s license is renewed, he argues that he has been deprived of an essential mode of transportation.   Emphasizing the importance of automobiles in modern society, Miller contends that his right to interstate travel encompasses a fundamental right to drive a car.

(Note the court makes no distinction between automobiles, cars, and motor vehicles and uses the terms interchangeably... they are all the same thing for the purpose of this case. Nor does the court address the use to which he puts the car, save Miller clearly claims it is for “travel,” as that is one right he seeks to vindicate…)

Miller does not have a fundamental “right to drive.”  (Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-16, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977))… and the DMV did not unconstitutionally impede his right to interstate travel by denying him a driver’s license… Without a valid driver’s license from his home state of California, Miller cannot legally drive anywhere in the United States.

We have previously held that burdens on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the right to interstate travel.   See Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., (“A rich man can choose to drive a limousine;  a poor man may have to walk.   The poor man’s lack of choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”)…

In an attempt to force California to issue him a driver’s license, Miller filed the present lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.   Among other claims, he asserted a claim for violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   He alleged that California Vehicle Code § 1653.5, which requires the DMV to obtain the social security number of all applicants for new or renewed drivers’ licenses, violates his federal constitutional right to interstate travel…

We conclude that by denying Miller a single mode of transportation-in a car driven by himself-the DMV did not unconstitutionally impede Miller’s right to interstate travel.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491

“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them”

And that is correct. But it does not say, nor does it mean that ALL rule making or legislation is forbidden, rather it applies to only those rules and laws which actually abrogate rights secured by the Constitution.

Pretty basic grammar.

 

Reitz v. Mealey 314 US 33 (1941) [U.S. Supreme Court][Driving]

The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process.

Reno v Condon 528 U.S. 141 (2000) [U.S. Supreme Court] [Sovereigns, Driving]

Some claim the MVD in your state is actually a Federal Agency and that the DPPA, Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 is proof that “driving” is commercial because the Federal government cannot regulate unless there is an Interstate Commerce rationale. They say this case, Reno v Condon, is proof of that. Here is what the Court actually said:

The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 ed. and Supp. IV), regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in the records of state motor vehicle departments (DMVs). We hold that in enacting this statute Congress did not run afoul of the federalism principles… State DMV s require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person’s name, address, telephone number, vehicle description, Social Security number, medical information, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver’s license or registering an automobile. Congress found that many States, in turn, sell this personal information to individuals and businesses… The United States asserts that … the personal, identifying information that the DPPA regulates is a “thin[g] in interstate commerce,” and that the sale or release of that information in interstate commerce is therefore a proper subject of congressional regulation…

The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information is also used in the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private entities for matters related to interstate motoring.

Because drivers’ information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation… the DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens; rather, it regulates the States as the owners of data bases.

So the case cited had nothing to do with commercial use of vehicles, or even licenses. It had to do with selling information in Interstate Commerce.

Riley vs. Laeson, 142 So. 619; or Riley v Lawson
See Stephenson v. Binford

Rodrigues v. Ray Donavan (U.S. Department of Labor) 769 F. 2d 1344, 1348 (1985)

“All codes, rules, and regulations are for government authorities only, not human/Creators in accordance with God’s laws. All codes, rules,and regulations are unconstitutional and lacking due process…”

This is a wonderfully supportive quote but once again it is simply made up; those words are not in the opinion; nor does the case conclude anything remotely like that.

That case is also cited as proof that courts are purely administrative, not judicial, but that is a complete misreading of the case, which revolved around a matter that was the subject of an administrative hearing. That case itself is an Equal Protection and Due Process claim under the Constitution filed in federal courts as a lawsuit, not an administrative hearing nor a ‘direct’ appeal from a hearing under statutory authority.

Schactman v. Dulles 96 App DC 287, 225 F2d 938 [US Court of Appeals Dist Columbia Circuit 1955] [Sovereigns, Driving]

“The right to travel, to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit, is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation under law

Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932) U.S. Supreme Court [Driving]
     aka Riley vs. Laeson, 142 So. 619
Googling the “Riley vs Laeson,” and “Riley v Lawson” as well as “142 So. 619” turned up nothing. It appears to be a mis-citation though if anyone finds it please link me up. It appears that at any rate the Riley case was quoting or referencing Stephenson v Binford.

[T]he only limitations found restricting the right of the state to condition the use of the public highways as a means of vehicular transportation for compensation are (1) that the state must not exact of those it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain that they surrender any of their inherent U.S. Constitutional Rights as a condition precedent to obtaining permission for such use….”      (Quoted to me in a YouTube comment)

 

I did find Stephenson v Binford. It does not say anything about “surrender [of] …Constitutional rights” and I doubt that Riley, if we ever find it will support that quote. Until I can find the Riley case however I can only consider Stephenson.

Here are points from the syllabus:

1. The highways of a State are public property, the primary and preferred use of which is for private purposes; their use for purposes of gain may generally be prohibited by the legislature or conditioned as it sees fit…..

3. Unregulated use of the public highways by a vast and constantly growing number of private contract carriers operating motor trucks had the effect of greatly decreasing the freight which would be carried by railroads within the state, and, in consequence, of adding to the burden upon the highways. Held: (1) That the removal or reduction of this burden, with its resulting injury to the highways, interference with their primary use, danger and inconvenience, was a legitimate subject for the exercise of the legislative power….

4. The judgment of the legislature as to fitness and efficiency of means adopted by it for a legitimate end must stand if it can be seen that, in any degree or under any reasonably conceivable circumstances, there is an actual relation between the means and the end; the legislative conclusion must be accepted by the courts if not manifestly wrong.

Analysis of Stephenson v Binford:

This is a case about whether the Legislature had the power to regulate businesses who were trucking for their own purposes but not as common carriers, without permits and a law that required them to obtain permits for such use, which was causing wear and congestion. From the start we must be clear that the PERMITS involved are not driver licenses of any sort, they are USE permits, granting the right to use the highways for a particular commercial reason.

“[The highways’] use for purposes of gain may generally be prohibited by the legislature or conditioned as it sees fit.”

Opponents of licensing doubtless wish to read this to mean that the Legislature may not do the same with private use. But the rule is that courts don’t make decisions on questions that are not in the case before the court. Since private licenses (again, we are talking USE licenses here not driving licenses) or private use of the highway is not at issue, the Court is making no decision or ruling on that point.

The comment about the primary use of highways is just that, a comment, a bit of context at the most, and “dicta” (“speaking”) not ruling.

This is not in any sense a case that speaks in any way to driver licensing.

But another message of the case is clear: as long as it seeks a legitimate end, any law the legislature makes that bears any conceivable relationship to obtaining that end must be accepted by the courts “if not manifestly wrong.”

In other words the courts do not second guess the policy decision of the Legislature and the Legislature generally has the power to pass what laws it thinks will achieve a legitimate end.

The case affirms the right of the state to regulate a particular aspect of business or commercial use of the highways; it certainly does not consider the question of driver licensing at all.

Further, the 4th syllabus point, sometimes called the “rational review standard,” applies to most law making by the states; and it in fact supports, for reasons of safety, the requirement to be licensed for all drivers. If the legislature finds safety will be improved to any degree it can require licenses and the courts must accept that if it is in any sense whatever possibly correct. (Yes there are limits but they don’t come into play here.)

State Courts

Berberian v. Petit (RI, 1977) RHODE ISLAND [Driving]

…It is equally clear that the right to operate a motor vehicle is not a fundamental right. The importance of that right to the individual in modern society does not determine whether it is to be regarded as fundamental for the purpose of review under the equal protection clause. …For equal protection purposes, only rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are fundamental. Id. at 33-34, 93 S. Ct. at 1297, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 43.

The right to operate a motor vehicle is wholly a creation of state law; it certainly is not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, and nothing in that document or in our state constitution has even the slightest appearance of an implicit guarantee of that right. The plaintiff’s argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel …is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right

Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221. Illinois [Driving]

“The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived.”

This is an Illinois Supreme Court decision. Note that the above quote does not say that requiring a driver’s license is unlawful, nor a violation of the right to travel. What it says at the most is that the right to travel can be exercised using highways, which does not imply a right to drive without license. In fact the case is about licensing a bus system to use the public streets.

It isn’t about driver licenses.

“The question for decision is, Has the city the power to prohibit the operation on its streets of motor busses, as common carriers of passengers, by a public utility which has obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity for such operation from the Illinois Commerce Commission?”
 

But sometimes a decision while not in a case on point nevertheless results in legal principles that do apply. However, if you think the case supports the idea that licenses cannot be required you will very disappointed. This is ALSO Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago:

“Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with horses and carriages. (Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31; Ward v. Meredith, 220 id. 66; Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465; Shinkle v. Mc- Cullough, 116 Ky. 960.) Many cases have been decided respecting the validity and construction of statutes and ordinances regulating their use upon public highways, and it has been uniformly held that the State, in the exercise of the police power, may regulate their speed and provide other reasonable rules and restrictions as to their use. (Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542; *206206 Christy v. Elliott, supra; State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517; State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62) Driven by indifferent, careless or incompetent operators these vehicles may be a menace to the safety of the traveling public, and it has been held that under its authority to regulate the use of the streets a city may enact ordinances which may diminish this danger, and for this purpose may regulate the speed of automobiles and repress their careless management. (City of Chicago v. Kluever, 257 Ill. 317; People v. Schneider, 139 Mich. 673; Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, supra; Brazier v. Philadelphia, 215 Pa. St. 297)

…Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience.

A fair reading of that paragraph would be that one way to repress “careless management” of vehicles would include licensing of drivers to ensure they are not “[d]riven by indifferent, careless or incompetent operators…and repress their careless management.”

Carter v. State, 702 S.W.2d 774, 778 (Tex.App.1986) TEXAS [Driving]

Carter argues that he has a constitutional right to travel on the public highways which the legislature may not take away by the requirement of a license. It is true that the right to travel interstate is a fundamental right under the United States Constitution. However, we agree with the Supreme Court of Colorado that the revocation of a driver’s license for violation of the traffic laws of the state does not unconstitutionally burden such right. See Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194, 613 P.2d 884, 887 (1980). We also agree with the holding of the Colorado court that the issuance of a driver’s license does not confer upon the licensee a right that is independently entitled to protection against any and all governmental interference or restriction. Id.

City of Bismarck v. Stuart 546 N.W.2d 366, 367 (N.D.1996) NORTH DAKOTA [Driving]

“Stuart argues that he has a constitutional right to operate an automobile on public roads without a driver’s license. No court has ever held that it is an impermissible infringement upon a citizen’s constitutional Right to Travel for the Legislature to decree that, unless exempted by statute, every person who operates a motor vehicle on public roads must have a valid operator’s license …The Legislature has the constitutional police power to ensure safe drivers and safe roads.

City of Salina v. Wisden (Utah 1987) 737 P2d 981 UTAH [Driving]

“Mr. Wisden’s assertion that the right to travel encompasses ‘the unrestrained use of the highway’ is wrong.  The right to travel granted by the state and federal constitutions does not include the ability to ignore laws governing the use of public roadways.  The motor vehicle code was promulgated to increase the safety and efficiency of our public roads.  It enhances rather than infringes on the right to travel. The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public roadway is not a fundamental right  it is a privilege that is granted upon the compliance with the statutory licensing procedures and may be revoked…

“Mr. Wisden’s contention [is] that the … court lacked jurisdiction to try him because his status as a “free man” exempts him from the motor vehicle code because he did not consent to be bound by it. We address this issue only because it is frequently raised and should be finally settled. We reject his claim. All of the provisions violated by Mr. Wisden regulate the conduct of persons. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-1(t) defines “person” as “[e]very natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation.” Mr. Wisden is a natural person and is therefore bound by the statutes he violated. Consent to laws is not a prerequisite to their enforceability against individuals. We take issue with Mr. Wisden’s assertion that “this type of legislation attempts to lead one to the conclusion that all are subject to the law, and amounts to nothing more than legal debauchery.”

In order for our scheme of ordered liberties to succeed, we must all obey valid laws, even those with which we do not agree; a man cannot exempt himself from the operation of a law simply by declaring that he does not consent to have it apply to him.

Commonwealth v Levy  194 Pa. Superior Ct. 390 (1961) PENNSYLVANIA [Driving]

A license to operate a motor vehicle on public highways is a privilege and not a property right.

Coyle v. State, 775 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App. 1989) TEXAS [Driving]

Coyle maintains that driving a motor vehicle is an inalienable and unregulatable “right” which may not be interfered with by the State of Texas. She argues that it is contrary to the federal constitution for the State of Texas to require a private citizen to secure a driver’s license before operating a motor vehicle on a public roadway….Although Coyle has put forth a good deal of time and energy vehemently arguing this point, it is clear that in Texas, a license or permit to drive an automobile on the public highways and streets is a privilege and not property or a property right. This privilege is subject to reasonable regulations under the police power in the interest of the welfare and safety of the general public. …. Coyle argues the State failed to define “driving” and “operating.” She claims harm in the fact that these words were used interchangeably at trial and in the charging instruments. These terms are synonymous; there is no error.

Galan v. State, 301 S.W.2d 141, (1957). TEXAS [Driving]

Appellant next complains of that portion of the court’s charge in which he instructed the jury that they might convict if they found that the appellant did “drive and operate” a motor vehicle on the grounds that the complaint and information charged only that he did “operate” a motor vehicle. We hold such terms to be synonymous, and the court’s charge to be proper.

Gordon v Beddard, 265 Mass 408 (1929) Massachusetts [Driving]

“The statute was passed to make the roads more safe and convenient for travelers by preventing unlicensed persons from operating motor vehicles thereon. The purpose of licensing operators of automobiles is to make it reasonably certain that the licensee is qualified for the task and a proper person to be licensed. Negligent operation of an automobile endangering the safety of other travelers is likely to follow if an unlicensed person is given complete control of its operation.”

House v. Cramer, 1 12 N. W. 3; 134 Iowa 374 (1907) IOWA [Driving]

The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel along the highways of the state, is no longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some vehicle.

House v Cramer is a 1907 Iowa Supreme Court case which says indeed that automobiles can use the roads. The case had to do with whether the driver of a car in 1904 was liable for scaring horses because when he stopped, not realizing horses were tied up nearby, he failed to suppress the spark and thus the sound of his engine. The horses apparently bolted at the sound, causing damage to property and themselves.

The court further said:

Assuming the law to be well settled by our decisions that one operating an automobile has the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses and is liable for the resulting accident only where he fails to use the degree of care as to speed and management of his machine which the circumstances reasonably require…

The heart of the opinion of the court is that drivers can indeed be held liable (but that the evidence did not show this driver had been negligent).

In Re White 97 Cal.App.3d.141, 158 Cal.Rptr. 562, 566-67 (1979) CALIFORNIA [Sovereigns]

Like all constitutional rights the right of free movement is not absolute and may be reasonably restricted in the public interest.

Luk v Commonwealth, 421 Mass 415 (1995) Massachusetts [Driving]

“Continued possession of this privilege is conditioned on obedience to the Legislature’s comprehensive regulatory scheme aimed at regulating the motorways and keeping them safe. The first statute requiring drivers’ licenses was promulgated in 1903. Even then, one could obtain a driver’s license only on “passing such examination as to his qualifications as may be required by the state highway commission,”

Maine v. Pelletier (ME, 2015) Supreme Court of Maine citing among others State v Pelletier  MAINE [Driving]

“…the only issues on appeal are whether the court below had jurisdiction to enforce the laws of the State of Maine against Pelletier and whether the requirement that each driver hold a valid driver’s license violates the United States Constitution

“Because these arguments, although frivolous , are raised with some regularity, we write to provide an *unambiguous declaration that Maine’s courts have jurisdiction to enforce Maine’s laws against those physically present within the state’s geographic bounds* and to reaffirm the constitutionality of Maine’s law requiring each driver to hold a valid driver’s license .
[And in this 3½ page decision the Court showed jurisdiction and Constitutionality. One of the simplest and most easily read cases you could find.]

Roberto v Department of Public Utilities  262 Mass. 583, 587 (Mass. 1928) Massachusetts [Driving]

“The constitutionality of the statute is settled. The Commonwealth has power to prescribe the conditions under which public ways may be used by motor vehicles, and can delegate the administration of such power …The department is given authority to prescribe the time during which the rights granted may be exercised.
…. The certificate was a privilege. It was neither a contract nor property, and its revocation deprived the petitioner of no vested rights…”

Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal 2d 488 CALIFORNIA [Driving]

–“No statutory duty lies to apply for, or to possess a driver license for personal travel and transportation as defendant is not within the class of persons for whose benefit or protection the statute was enacted.”–

No.  That quote is fake.  It is not anywhere in the Routh v. Quinn opinion. The case is about a claim made due to the tax redemption sale of a dehydrating plant. It says nothing relevant to travel or driving.

Self v. Rhay 61 Wn.2d 261 (1963)377 P.2d 885 [Sovereigns]

“The common law is the real law, the supreme Law of the land, the code, rules, regulations, policy and statutes are “not the law”

Well that seems clear enough; this quote also is offered to support the idea that statutes are not laws. The problem is that Self v. Rhay says no such thing. The quote is fraudulent. Those words are not there. Nothing like that is in the decision. 

State v. Davis (Mo.App 1988) 745 SW2d 249 Missouri [Driving]

Davis next contends that he was not operating a motor vehicle, but was merely “traveling in a conveyance” when arrested, and therefore, he did not violate the statute. His reasoning for this premise that the statute in question is for the purpose of regulating commerce and has no application to individuals who are merely “traveling,” is not based on any relevant statute or case precedent, and has no merit…the operation of a motor vehicle upon public highways is a privilege, or at the most a qualified right, it is properly controlled by the exercise of state police power…. In the exercise of such police power, a state may require a person to be licensed as a condition precedent to operating a motor vehicle upon public highways. Williams v. Schaffner, 477 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. Banc 1972)… Since Davis was in actual physical control of the pickup truck, he was operating a motor vehicle.

State v Booher (TN 1997) TENNESSEE [Driving]

    …the appellant asserts that the State of Tennessee has unduly infringed upon his “right to travel” by requiring licensing and registration of his motor vehicles prior to operation on the public roadways of this state… at no time did the State of Tennessee place constraints upon the appellant’s exercise of this right.   His right to travel within this state or to points beyond its boundaries remains unimpeded … Requiring persons to obtain a driver’s license and to register their automobiles with the State provides a means of identifying the owner of the automobile if negligently operated to the damage of other persons…because it is a means of guaranteeing a minimal level of driver competence, licensing improves safety on our highways and, thus, protects and enhances the well being of the residents and visitors of our state. Thus, our state legislature may properly within the scope of its police power enact reasonable regulations requiring licensing and registration.”

“…the appellant presents additional arguments relating to whether his automobile is a “motor vehicle” … whether he is exempted from such regulations because of his “use” of his automobile;  and whether he is required to obtain a Tennessee driver’s license…The appellant’s 1985 Dodge Daytona is a motor vehicle contemplated by the regulations, said vehicle is driven upon the public roads of this state…These issues are without merit.”

State [Minnesota] v. Cuypers, 559 N.W.2d 435, 436-37 (Minn.App.1997) [Driving]

This case is cited in State v Hershberger; (State’s mandatory automobile insurance laws do not violate constitutional right to travel or to due process);

State [KANSAS] v. Hershberger (KS, 2000)  [Driving]

Hershberger argues that the State had no authority to charge him with driving on a suspended license because he was using his car for personal and not commercial purposes.   Hershberger’s argument seems to be that because he has a constitutional right to travel, he can drive on all public streets and highways without complying with any regulation when he uses his vehicle only for personal purposes. Hershberger has cited no statute which exempts him from the requirement of having a driver’s license if he operates a motor vehicle on the public roadways. Instead, he essentially contends these statutes violate his constitutional right to travel.

These laws were not designed to deter interstate or intrastate migration, nor do they penalize someone for exercising the right to travel. States have a compelling interest in ensuring that motor vehicles are operated in a safe fashion on public roads and highways.   Therefore, States may adopt “[a]ny appropriate means ․ to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway” without violating due process.

“It is elementary that the right to operate a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway is not a natural or unrestrained right but a privilege which is subject to reasonable regulations under the police power of the state in the interest of the public’s safety and welfare. “ (Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 [1961].)   The driver’s license is not a contract or a property right … The privilege is granted to those who are qualified, who comply with reasonable police power requirements in the interest of public safety and welfare, and is withheld from those who do not.
Appellate courts across the country have rejected the type of argument Hershberger raises. The reasoning in these cases is two-fold.   First, regulations pertaining to licensing and registration of vehicles do not deter one’s right to travel because operating a car is only one of many ways to travel.   Second, these courts recognize the purpose of such regulations is to advance the public interest in ensuring the competency of drivers operating on the roadway and that drivers have adequate financial security to compensate potential injured parties.   For these reasons, these regulatory schemes have consistently been held constitutional

STATE  [MAINE] v. PELLETIER•587 A.2d 1100, (Me. 1991)  [Driving]

… the right to . . . “use the public streets . . . is not an absolute and unqualified right. It is subject to be limited and controlled by the sovereign authority — the State, whenever necessary to provide for and promote the safety, peace, health, morals, and general welfare of the people. To secure these and kindred benefits is the purpose of organized government, and to that end may the power of the State, called its police power, be used. By exercise of that power, through legislative enactments, individuals may be subjected to restraints . . . if manifestly necessary to . . . secure and advance the safety, comfort and prosperity of its people. And it is a fundamental law that no constitutional guarantee is violated by such an exercise of the police power of the State when manifestly necessary and tending to secure such general and public benefits.

(In those two Maine rulings we see the courts dismiss the idea that the State is not sovereign and affirm it has jurisdiction over any person within its boundaries; then go on to show that the use of the police power is the basis of license laws and does not violate the constitution. The 2015 decision also quotes the US Supreme Court in Hendrick v.Maryland.)

State [Montana] v. Skurdal  767 P.2d 304  (MT, 1988) [Driving]

“We reject Skurdal’s claim that because he owes nothing on his car (private property) and is not engaged in commercial travel, his liberty interests are infringed by stopping his vehicle. That claim is baseless in Montana, and we find no law in any other jurisdiction to support it either. We will not entertain it further.  We hold… it is a proper exercise of the State’s Police Power to require a valid driver’s license before one may operate a motor vehicle on the public highways.

Spokane v Port, 716 P.2d 945.(1986) [Washington]  [Driving]

Ms. Port contends RCW 46.20.021 [is] unconstitutional as applied to her because [it] improperly restrict[s] her right to travel upon the public highways.

It is well settled that the United States Constitution protects an individual’s right to travel. This fundamental constitutional right applies both to interstate and intrastate travel. Ms. Port attempts to extend this fundamental rule, alleging she has a right, rather than privilege, to operate a motor vehicle upon public highways and streets. …driving an automobile on our state’s public highways is a privilege and not a right because the activity is limited to a certain class of individuals, generally those over the age of 16 years, who have passed a driver’s license examination….This privilege is always subject to such reasonable regulation and control as the proper authorities see fit to impose under the police power in the interest of public safety and welfare.See State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash. 2d 872, 880, 514 P.2d 1052 (1973) (one does not have an absolute constitutional right to a particular mode of travel)See Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 86 L. Ed. 21, 62 S. Ct. 24 (1941). In Reitz, the United States Supreme Court examined the privilege to travel on our public streets and highways and concluded, in 314 U.S. at 36:

Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process.

“….RCW 46.20.021 requires a license to drive or operate a motor vehicle upon our state highways. Licensing is a means by which the State may determine whether vehicle operators have acquired a minimal standard of competence. Mandating driver competence is a public purpose within the police power of the state because it furthers the interests of public safety and welfare. …Ms. Port claims she is constitutionally entitled to this special status because she is not engaged in commercial travel….[she] claims the state licensing statute applies only to commercial operators of motor vehicles. She claims since she was not engaged in the business of transportation, she did not violate the act.”

“RCW 46.20.021, reads: “No person . . . may drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless the person has a valid driver’s license issued under the provisions of this chapter.”

Ms. Port’s argument that this provision requires a license only for those operating commercial vehicles is clearly without merit. RCW 46.04.370 eliminates any alleged ambiguity with respect to the violation here because the section defines an operator or driver as “every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Since Ms. Port was in actual physical control of her vehicle when stopped, she came under the provisions of RCW Title 46.”
(Review denied by [Washington] Supreme Court July 8, 1986.)

Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579 Virginia [Driving]

“The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

Often wrongly cited, this is not a U.S. Supreme Court decision, it is a Virginia Supreme Court decision.

A law was challenged which gave the Chief of Police power to suspend or revoke licenses at will.  This court held that licenses could not be arbitrarily granted or withheld — not that they could not be required at all.  Just the opposite in fact.  The part of the opinion that ‘supports’ the theory has been cherry-picked and the part of the decision that actually supports licensing is overlooked or deliberatelyperry concealed. This is why entire decisions must be read…

With regard to the right of the government to require licensing or permits to drive, you can see it is squarely on point and completely supports licensing requirements:

“A city may, in the exercise of its police power, invest its administrative and executive officers with a reasonable discretion in the performance of duties devolved upon them to that end, whenever it is necessary for the safety and welfare of the public.” …

[1, 2] …The power of a city to control and regulate the use of its streets is a continuing power to be exercised as often and whenever the city may think proper. …The issuance and revocation of such permits by a city is merely a means of exercising the police power of the State delegated to the city to regulate the use of the public highways in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The Constitution of Virginia expressly provides that “the exercise of the police power of the State shall never be abridged.” (Constitution Virginia, section 159.)…

[6-8] The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways … includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon…

[9]  The exercise of such a common right the city may, under its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare…

[10]  The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking, under rules of general application, permits to drive an automobile on its streets...

I can go further. The right to travel, it says is a common law right. While I think the Supreme Court has now accorded it a higher standard, that of a Constitutional right, if it is merely a common law right it can be taken away by statute (Meister v. Moore 96 U.S. 76 (1877)) and the right to travel can be regulated (Kent v. Dulles,  357 US 116, 125; Schactman v. Dulles 96 App DC 287, 225 F2d 938, at 94)

Other

California Constitution Article IV Section 8 (b) (1)

“The Legislature may make no law except by statute and may enact no statute except by bill.”

In dismissing a suit for the refund of all federal income tax, social security, and Medicare contributions withheld from the plaintiff’s wages between 1993 and 1994, Judge Kimba Wood wrote:

“Plaintiff thus appears to argue that this Court should look to principles of natural law, or more accurately, his preferred principles of natural law, as opposed to the positive law by which it is bound. That, however, is not this province of this Court.”

 

=                                  More Blogs by Philipem 1000                                  =

Sovereign Citizens and Fellow Travelers
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fD
Sovereign Citizens and the Jurisdictional Gambit:
You Can’t Touch Me!
https://wp.me/p3nYC8-1q5
Sovereigns inaccurately cite Court Cases,
in their effort to show the courts
have no jurisdiction.
.
=                                                          The Law                                                          =
Sources Of Law and Authority
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fF
Are Statutes Laws?  What About Regulations ?
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-Od
Strawman Theory and CAPITAL Letters
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-TB
.
=                                                  The US and the States                                                =
 The United States Is A Corporation
(Or If You Prefer, It Can Be An Elephant
)
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fK
The US Became Bankrupt in 1933
& Federal Reserve Notes are Not Legal Currency
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fO
The United States is still a British Colony  http://wp.me/p3nYC8-kz
There are Three United States
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fX
.
=                                                 The Courts                                                     =
A Lost 13th Amendment to the Constitution Removes all Legitimacy from Courts; Judges hold Illegal Titles from the King/Queen
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-kI
All US Courts are Courts of Admiralty and hear only Admiralty Cases
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fV
US Courts are, well, not Admiralty after all, but instead Equity Courts
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-l2
US Courts are Administrative, Not Judicial
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fR
All Lawyers take a Secret Oath to Hide ‘The TRUTH
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-l2
Posted in Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Who Says You Must Have A Driver’s License?

Why I write: In these blogs I wish to protect people from falling into the trap of believing bogus legal theories and ending up with really bad consequences.

I have a series of blogs on wider subjects and claims of which this is a very focused specific subset. I will try very briefly to cover some of the wider issues that get raised but I am trying very hard to make this blog easy to read and relatively short. I provide links to more detailed examinations, and to every law and court decision so you can read them for yourself.

Who I am: I am a private individual, a retired businessman. I am not an attorney, just an educated and interested party who doesn’t want to see people  losing their money, property or freedom due to misinformation.

You Don’t Need A License? Really?

No. You really do. It’s the law.

For a long time there have been people insisting that you do not need a driver’s license to “drive.” They base their belief on a variety of ideas and arguments. They generally make one of these basic claims:

  • There’s no law that says you have to have a license,
  • Those laws don’t apply to YOU (or they don’t apply to THEM);
  • “The laws don’t say what you think they do, because words like vehicle, motor vehicle or transport or traffic or driver or person or others are all terms of commerce (or are in “legalese” and have some other meaning than in plain English) and therefore don’t regulate anything private;

This is the first of a series blogs designed to show:

(1) There is such law, and you do require a license to do what we in plain English call “drive” a car or other motor vehicle.

(2) The arguments that they make are easily rebuttable where they are not outright laughable.

(3) There are, contrary to their assertions,

  • NO court cases in the past 100+ years to support this belief  system.

  • Dozens upon dozens of cases at every level (state and federal, trial and appellate courts) directly and clearly dismiss the ideas and arguments they make. 

And for this blog and this writer all legal disputes are ultimately resolved by courts, the branch of government tasked with deciding what laws say and what they mean. There must be some authority for resolving those questions. The judicial branch is that authority.

This blog in its earlier revisions has become unwieldy and long and that’s because there are a lot of other reasons people use to deny the laws and so many and so complex that to put them into one blog is a problem. I’ve moved discussions of these issues beyond bare bones to other blogs.

Things Not Discussed Here (but are Discussed Elsewhere)

Some ideas we won’t spend a lot of time on in the blogs here — I do have detailed explorations debunking each and you will see there are links to those other blogs when appropriate —  but which arise often include:

  • Sovereign Citizens” or their fellow travelers who deny that the Federal or State government or both are actually governments:
    • Claim these are private corporations;
    • Claim that therefore the government has no power unless they contract with government;
    • Claim the laws can only apply to them if they personally consent, either to specific laws or the system in general;
    • Claim the courts likewise have no power without their consent.
  • Some may in conjunction with those claims take the position that only the Federal government can make laws about the operation of vehicles and its authority is restricted to interstate commerce not personal travel. (Right about the last part wrong about the first.)

Right. What Laws Are We Talking About?

In every one of the fifty states and in each US Territory there are laws similar to those of Washington, varying usually only in minor ways as to wording. In the blog that follows we will look at the details of Arizona, California, Florida Texas, Ohio, and Washington. But rest assured all the other states are essentially the same. If you want to find the laws in your state google: “[Name of State] driver license statutes”

The Laws of Washington State
as a typical example:  

RCW 46.20.001  (1) No person may drive a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without first obtaining a valid driver’s license issued to Washington residents …The only exceptions to this requirement are those expressly allowed by RCW 46.20.025.

RCW 46.20.005  . Except as expressly exempted by this chapter, it is a misdemeanor [crime] for a person to drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without a valid driver’s license

RCW 46.04.405 “Person” includes every natural person, firm, copartnership, corporation, association, or organization.

RCW 46.04.356 Natural person” means a human being.

[therefore it is a misdemeanor for every human being to drive without a valid license]

RCW 46.04.370 “ Operator or driver ” means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.

RCW 46.04.320 “Motor vehicle” means every vehicle that is self-propelled

RCW 46.04.670 “Vehicle” includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which, any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles…

…. Note that there is no reference in these laws or definitions as to the purpose for which a vehicle is used, the commercial or non-commercial use of the vehicle, roadways, nor status of the driver. The law is not limited to those considerations. Person is the  criterion. Any person, every person, must have a license to operate or drive a self propelled vehicle.  And ‘person’ means a human being . And it applies to any motor vehicle, the language is sweeping, ““Motor vehicle” means any self-propelled vehicle.”

From a Washington Supreme Court decision:

“Ms. Port’s argument that this provision requires a license only for those operating commercial vehicles is clearly without merit.Since Ms. Port was in actual physical control of her vehicle when stopped, she came under the provisions of RCW Title 46.
Spokane v Port, 716 P.2d 945.(1986)

We will examine these provisions in more depth and look at what the other states laws look like in a moment.

Having shown you the actual law, which most people have never read, many of you are saying “Oh, yeah that’s pretty clear. Licenses are required.”

Good for you. The opposition to the idea has many objections, some we’ll address; some we will defer to other blogs, but we will answer every one.

But let’s address a couple of issues as preface to the issue:

Federal vs State?  An argument is made that federal law controls based on a number of sometimes wildly strange ideas… The Federal Government’s Constitution was replaced by the Act of 1871 that created a government for the District of Columbia… or by creating the Federal Reserve; or by allegedly declaring bankruptcy in 1933 or some other date;  and the United States is no longer a Republic, it is a corporation… and so are the States.

We won’t do those here they are addressed at the links above and at the bottom.

In fact the Federal government regulates automobiles and all motor vehicles as products made and transported across state lines; and as they are used in interstate commerce per the Constitution’s grant to Congress of authority to control interstate commerce in Article I Section 8.

The Federal government has enacted provisions to promote and support state regulation; for example interstate commercial drivers must be licensed by a state, not the Federal Government which doesn’t issue licenses except in the territories or to its own employees. It could of course, but it decided instead to work with the states and that the issues of licensing were best dealt with by the states and now people don’t have to have two licenses.

It has created for example a nationwide database of licenses so a state knows that a person has only one license from one state; and if that driver has been suspended or has many violations in another state he cannot evade the consequences by going to another state and getting a license there.

But the Federal government has NOT “preempted” state regulation (and has no authority to do so for the most part); and definitions in various Federal laws are limited to those specific laws even though the naysayers try to use them to “prove” that the words in state laws don’t apply to you. Those federal definitions re carefully restricted and limited and usually do apply only to commercial activities since that’s all the Feds can regulate.

The Police Power

Where does the State’s authority for that come from? Since the Roman Republic over 2000 years ago a principle of law has been recognized that the state (any and every state or nation) has the power to make laws designed to protect the health, safety and welfare of the people. This power is called “the police power” (not to be confused with police officer powers, better known as law enforcement officers’ authority.)  The constitution grants this power to the states through Amendment X.

The zoning code, the building code, the electrical code, the health code in your city or state are all examples of the police power at work. Stop signs, street signs, crosswalks all exist to help things work better and protect people.

The Federal government does not posses a general police power it only has the specific powers delegated to it (but that includes police power over federal property, territories, and the District of Columbia).

Is the Government A Corporation?

Challenges that the governments are not really governments. I’ll mostly link to other blogs on these subjects, but a brief summary here is necessary.

  • If governments are “corporations” the argument is they have no power over us unless we make an agreement with them. So we only have to have a license, or indeed obey the laws, if we are engaged in commerce, have a business relationship with the state, sign an agreement, etc.
  • No State government (nor the Federal) agrees that it is a corporation; and the courts also disagree. Indeed there has never been any court that ruled this is true. None. Ever. Anywhere.

These arguments profoundly lack logic:

People get put in jail;is that a business function?
Did you sign a contract that includes potential jail time?
Can a corporation give you the death penalty? Is that a matter for contract law? Who would sign that contract??
How does any Corporation get the right to try and punish you for crimes?
Can I get Apple or Microsoft to try me instead of say, Virginia?
I might like their judges better. I would rather go to jail at Microsoft, they have an awesome cafeteria.

“Oh you didn’t agree to be a citizen sir? Well run along then this speeding ticket isn’t for you…no need to have a license either…”

Of course not!

This alone is enough to show the theory has no credible basis.  But in fact we can demonstrate that States are recognized as sovereign states under the Constitution.  State sovereignty is traced right back to the days when the royal colonies declared  independence, and took on the sovereign character formerly exercised by the Crown.

Chief Justice John Jay, just four years after the Constitution was adopted wrote:

“From the Crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it… and thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the Revolution…. the people nevertheless continued to consider themselves, in a national point of view, as one people …and then the people, in their collective and national capacity, established the present Constitution…

Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves…
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 2 Dall. 419 419 (1793)

Furthermore the idea that anyone is exempt from the laws or from the power and jurisdiction of government is nonsense:

“The several States of the Union …except as restrained and limited by [the Constitution], …possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them …One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)

That could not be more clear.

One brief point on sovereignty. Many claim for various reason that there is no legitimate application of this sovereignty to them as they didn’t agree to it or accept it. While I think there is a better argument in opposition to that point than this one, we won’t delve so deeply in this blog.

Sovereignty means the ability, the practical and demonstrable ability of an entity to control a territory and its people, particularly to the exclusion of others and especially in areas traditionally that of the state such as taxes, police power and others. It is not theoretical, If you rule — whether benignly, with popular votes and human rights, or iron-fisted and oppressive — you are sovereign and you control all unless they can effectively change that situation.

The Right to Travel

Claim that the Constitutional right to travel means that you can drive without a license.

Not only does this fly in the face of the laws on driving it also is specifically denounced by numerous court rulings.

 

Posted in Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Compendium of Cases

Shortlink to this blog:  http://wp.me/p3nYC8-17X
Last update: 1 Jul 2018

This blog is a collection of court cases that I quote regularly in response to sovereign citizen ideas and to challenges to the driver license laws.

These are listed by the level of court, then alphabetically by case.

I recently encountered another list of cases and found almost all of them to be fake quotes on the topic of jurisdiction. I put that document and my comments on it as a separate blog,  Sovereign Citizens and the Jurisdictional Gambit: You Can’t Touch Me!

International (Canada)

Meads v Meads 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII) [Canada] [Sovereigns, Driving]

This case covers virtually every aspect and claim of “Sovereign Citizens” as proffered under the Anglophile legal systems.

“[442]… {quoting. Justice Gauthier in Canada (Minister of National Revenue ‑ M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 (CanLII) at paras. 17, 27, 340 F.T.R. 150:} …The whole notion of their being a second capacity distinct from the one of a natural person or human being is a pure fiction, one which is not sanctioned by law. One can describe nothing in any terms one wishes; it still remains nothing.”

U. S. Federal Courts

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1798) (opinion dissenting in part): [Sovereigns]

“If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice.

The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.”

Under this principle of constitutional law, the courts cannot refuse to enforce a law merely because one or more judges believe that the tax is contrary to their concepts of “natural law” or “natural rights.”

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 2 Dall. 419 419 (1793) [Sovereigns]

“From the Crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it… and thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the Revolutionthe people, in their collective and national capacity, established the present Constitution..and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner…

Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, 272 U. S. 686 [Sovereigns]

The sovereignty of the United States raises a presumption against its suability unless it is clearly shown; nor should a court enlarge its liability to suit conferred beyond what the language [of the statute in question] requires.”

Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473,1477 (9th Cir.1993) [Driving]

“Because Mrs. Hallstrom … by her actions, demonstrated that she was likely to continue driving without a license, Officer Snapp did not violate her rights under Idaho law or the Constitution by making the arrest .”

Hendrick v. Maryland 235 US 610 (1915) [Driving]

The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves… In the absence of national legislation covering the subject a State may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles — those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers… This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the States and essential to the preservation of the health, safety and comfort of their citizens….There is no solid foundation for the claim that the statute directly interferes with the rights of citizens of the United States to pass through the State,…here the statute at most attempts to regulate the operation of dangerous machines on the highways…

Hess v. Pawloski 274 US 352 (1927) [Sovereigns, Driving]

The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and, even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its highways.

Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 448 (1884) [Sovereigns]

“Congress is authorized to establish a national currency, either in coin or in paper, and to make that currency lawful money for all purposes, as regards the national government or private individuals.”

Kane v New Jersey 42 U.S. 160 (1916) [US Supreme Court] [Driving]

The power of a state to regulate the use of motor vehicles on its highways has been recently considered by this Court and broadly sustained. …As we there said “In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles — those moving in interstate commerce as well as others.”

Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116, 125 [US Supreme Court] [Driving]

The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment….

If a citizen’s liberty to travel is to be regulated [by Congress], it must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of Congress, any delegation of the power must be subject to adequate standards, and such delegated authority will be narrowly construed.

The principles involved if applied to licensing drivers do not affect those licensing requirements. A license doesn’t violate due process. Since the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment would be at issue in a state case this precedent may not matter anyway.

Laine v. City of Livermore; Case No. 15-cv-03656-VC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016) [District Court] [Driving]

“The constitutional right to travel does not create a constitutional right to drive. The state can require drivers to be licensed. The state can require drivers to be insured. The state can require drivers to register their cars. States don’t depend on the Commerce Clause for their authority to regulate private behavior, so it’s irrelevant whether drivers are traveling for business purposes or across state lines.”

Lubben v. Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972)

This case is cited by sovereigns in their endless quest to challenge jurisdiction.The part in red below is found quoted on many of their sites the part in bold is never mentioned…

A void judgment is to be distinguished from an erroneous one, in that the latter is subject only to direct attack. A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect. In the interest of finality, the concept of void judgments is narrowly construed. While absence of subject matter jurisdiction may make a judgment void, such total want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. A court has the power to determine its own jurisdiction, and an error in that determination will not render the judgment void. Only in the rare instance of a clear usurpation of power will a judgment be rendered void.”

Marbury v Madison, 5th US (2 Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803) [Sovereigns]

“All laws, rules and practices which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void”

 Indeed the Marbury decision is the famous defining opinion of the Judicial Branch’s role in declaring laws unconstitutional and it does stand for that proposition. However,to say this is an absolute ban on rules or regulations is to misunderstand the grammatical meaning of it; to misconstrue the meaning of the key phrase: “which are repugnant to the Constitution” as it applies only to those rules or regulations which are unConstitutional.

Matthew v. Honish, 233 F. App’x 563, 564 [7th Circuit Court 2007] [Driving]

Without vehicle licenses, Dean is denied only “a single mode of transportation — in a car driven by himself…and this does not impermissibly burden his right to travel.”

McCann  v. Greenway  952 F. Supp. 647 (WD Missouri, 1997)[District Court][Sovereigns]

“Mr. McCann feels that the fringed flag in some way restricted the state court’s jurisdiction to hold a custody hearing that disadvantaged him. He stakes his suit against these Defendants upon such a claim, because this is his sole argument against dismissal… Nor are the fringe or the eagle of any legal significance. Even were Mr. McCann to prove that yellow fringe or a flagpole eagle converted the state court’s United States flag to a maritime flag of war, the Court cannot fathom how the display of a maritime war flag could limit the state court’s jurisdictionJurisdiction is a matter of law, statute, and constitution, not a child’s game wherein one’s power is magnified or diminished by the display of some magic talisman….In flag manufacture a fringe is not considered to be a part of the flag and it is without heraldic significance....

Other Courts have considered [the “fringed flag” argument]. Those courts have labeled the position as “frivolous” [United States v. Greenstreet, 912 F.Supp. 224, 229 (N.D.Tex.1996)], “totally frivolous” [Vella v. McCammon, 671 F.Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D.Tex.1987)], “preposterous” [Commonwealth v. Appel, 438 Pa.Super. 214, 218, 652 A.2d 341, 343 (1994)], and “a[n]… unintelligible assertion” [Leverenz v. Torluemlu, 1996 WL 272538 (N.D.Ill.1996) (not reported in F.Supp.)]. This Court agrees.

Furthermore, Mr. McCann is hereby warned that the Court will reward future frivolous arguments with monetary sanctions. 

Meister v. Moore 96 U.S. 76 (1877)[U.S. Supreme Court] [Sovereigns]

No doubt a statute may take away a common law right, but there is always a presumption that the legislature has no such intention unless it be plainly expressed.”

Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 [9th Circuit Court of Appeals 1999] [Driving]

Without a valid driver’s license from his home state of California, Miller cannot legally drive anywhere in the United States…” The Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel Burdens placed on travel generally, such as gasoline taxes, or minor burdens impacting interstate travel, such as toll roads, do not constitute a violation of that right, however….
“We have previously held that burdens on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the right to interstate travel. … (“A rich man can choose to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor man’s lack of choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”) …(“At most, [the] argument reduces to the feeble claim that passengers have a constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel. That notion, as any experienced traveler can attest, finds no support whatsoever in [the Supreme Court’s right of interstate travel jurisprudence] or in the airlines’ own schedules.”)….

“We conclude that by denying Miller a single mode of transportation-in a car driven by himself- the DMV did not unconstitutionally impede Miller’s right to interstate travel... “In Dixon v. Love (1977)…the Supreme Court held that a state could summarily suspend or revoke the license of a motorist …The Court conspicuously did not afford the possession of a driver’s license the weight of a fundamental right.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491

“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them”

And that is correct. But it does not say, nor does it mean that ALL rule making or legislation is forbidden, rather it applies to only those rules and laws which actually abrogate rights secured by the Constitution.

Pretty basic grammar.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) [US Supreme Court] [Sovereigns]

“The several States of the Union …except as restrained and limited by [the Constitution], …possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them …One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.

Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) [Sovereigns]

Sometimes claimed that this case validates or confirms the “bankruptcy” of the U.S. and its consequent “loss of sovereignty” but it does the exact opposite if anything.

SCOTUS held that the government could not change the existing bond Mr Perry held which was denominated in gold, then moved to the question of damages and found he would suffered none after being paid in Federal Reserve Notes.

“In substance that the government cannot by contract restrict the exercise of a sovereign power. But the right to make binding obligations is a competence attaching to sovereignty. 3 In the United States, sovereignty resides in the people who act through the organs established by the Constitution. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 471; Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 Dall. 54, 93; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404, 405; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 , 6 S.Ct. 1064. The Congress as the instrumentality of sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the Constitution ordains.

The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared. The powers conferred upon the Congress are harmonious. The Constitution gives to the Congress the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, an unqualified power, a power vital to the government, upon which in an extremity its very life may depend. The binding quality of the promise of the United States is of the essence of the credit which is so pledged.

Having this power to authorize the issue of definite obligations for the payment of money borrowed, the Congress has not been vested with authority to alter or destroy those obligations. The fact that the United States may not be sued without its consent is a matter of procedure which does not affect the legal and binding character of its contracts. While the Congress is under no duty to provide remedies through the courts, the contractual obligation still exists, and, despite infirmities of procedure, remains binding upon the conscience of the sovereign. Lynch v. United States, supra, pages 580, 582, of 292 U.S. 54 S.Ct. 840.

“Plaintiff’s damages could not be assessed without regard to the internal economy of the country at the time the alleged breach occurred. The discontinuance of gold payments and the establishment of legal tender currency on a standard unit of value with which ‘all forms of money’ of the United States were to be ‘maintained at a parity’ had a controlling influence upon the domestic economy. It was adjusted to the new basis. A free domestic market for gold was nonexistent.

‘Plaintiff demands the ‘equivalent’ in currency of the gold coin promised. But ‘equivalent’ cannot mean more than the amount of money which the promised gold coin would be worth to the bondholder for the purposes for which it could legally be used. That equivalence or worth could not properly be ascertained save in the light of the domestic and restricted market which the Congress had lawfully established. In the domestic transactions to which the plaintiff was limited, in the absence of special license, determination of the value of the gold coin would necessarily have regard to its use as legal tender and as a medium of exchange under a single monetary system with an established parity of all currency and coins. And, in view of the control of export and foreign exchange, and the restricted domestic use, the question of value, in relation to transactions legally available to the plaintiff, would require a consideration of the purchasing power of the dollars which the plaintiff could have received. Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that in relation to buying power he has sustained any loss whatever. On [294 U.S. 330, 358] the contrary, in view of the adjustment of the internal economy to the single measure of value as established by the legislation of the Congress, and the universal availability and use throughout the country of the legal tender currency in meeting all engagements, the payment to the plaintiff of the amount which he demands would appear to constitute, not a recoupment of loss in any proper sense, but an unjustified enrichment.

So Mr Perry was not damaged by not having his gold bond paid in gold coin. Legal tender is the equivalent.

Reitz v. Mealey 314 US 33 (1941) [U.S. Supreme Court][Driving]

The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process.

Reno v Condon 528 U.S. 141 (2000) [U.S. Supreme Court] [Sovereigns, Driving]

Some claim the MVD in your state is actually a Federal Agency and that the DPPA, Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 is proof that “driving” is commercial because the Federal government cannot regulate unless there is an Interstate Commerce rationale. They say this case, Reno v Condon, is proof of that. Here is what the Court actually said:

The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 ed. and Supp. IV), regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in the records of state motor vehicle departments (DMVs). We hold that in enacting this statute Congress did not run afoul of the federalism principles… State DMV s require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person’s name, address, telephone number, vehicle description, Social Security number, medical information, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver’s license or registering an automobile. Congress found that many States, in turn, sell this personal information to individuals and businesses… The United States asserts that … the personal, identifying information that the DPPA regulates is a “thin[g] in interstate commerce,” and that the sale or release of that information in interstate commerce is therefore a proper subject of congressional regulation…

The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information is also used in the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private entities for matters related to interstate motoring.

Because drivers’ information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation… the DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens; rather, it regulates the States as the owners of data bases.

So the case cited had nothing to do with commercial use of vehicles, or even licenses. It had to do with selling information in Interstate Commerce.

Riley vs. Laeson, 142 So. 619; or Riley v Lawson See Stephenson v. Binford

Rodrigues v. Ray Donavan (U.S. Department of Labor) 769 F. 2d 1344, 1348 (1985) [Sovereigns]

“All codes, rules, and regulations are for government authorities only, not human/Creators in accordance with God’s laws. All codes, rules,and regulations are unconstitutional and lacking due process…”

This is a wonderfully supportive quote but once again it is simply made up; those words are not in the opinion; nor does the case conclude anything remotely like that.

That case is also cited as proof that courts are purely administrative, not judicial, but that is a complete misreading of the case, which revolved around a matter that was the subject of an administrative hearing. That case itself is an Equal Protection and Due Process claim under the Constitution filed in federal courts as a lawsuit, not an administrative hearing nor a ‘direct’ appeal from a hearing under statutory authority. See Also Marbury v Madison

Russell v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 24, 25 (W.D. Mich. 1997)

…Petitioner has raised one new argument in that he claims because his name is in all capital letters on the summons, he is not subject to the summons. As to this argument, this Court will follow the Eighth Circuit when it responded to an argument of similar merit when it stated “[t]hese issues are completely without merit, patently frivolous, and will be rejected without expending any more of this Court’s resources on their discussion.” United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir.1992) cert. denied Ziebarth v. United States, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2447, 124 L.Ed.2d 664 (1993).

Sadlier V. Payne 974 F. Supp. 1411 (D. Utah 1997)

Apparently the plaintiff believes that when a court flies a yellow-fringed flag, it has created a new “foreign state/power” within the “sanctuary” or “territory of the bar” within the courtroom it is obvious that the mere display of a yellow fringed flag does not have the conversionary effect the plaintiff claims ...as for the core proposition asserted in the complaint that yellow fringe on the flag somehow converted the jurisdiction of the state court into a “foreign state/power” thus denying the Plaintiff his contracted rights to due process under the United States Constitution …the District Court for the Western District of Missouri has recently and thoroughly examined this theory and found it wholly without merit.

Schactman v. Dulles 96 App DC 287, 225 F2d 938 [US Court of Appeals Dist Columbia Circuit 1955] [Sovereigns, Driving]

“The right to travel, to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit, is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation under law

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) [U.S. Supreme Court, driving]

“the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited.

The Court’s right to travel cases lend little support to the view that congressional action is invalid merely because it burdens the right to travel”

Schneider v. Schlaefer, 975 F. Supp. 1160 (ED Wisconsin, 1997) [District Court] [Sovereigns]

The complaint is a confusing narrative of legal jargon generally incomprehensible to the Court and counsel alike…. Though the facts of cases like these will vary, they all turn upon the same underlying theme, wherein the plaintiff contests the jurisdiction of various state court proceedings, or the validity of certain state law enforcement efforts, because the same were purportedly taken under the “maritime flag of war” as opposed to the aforementioned “American flag of peace”. … The difference between the two flags is cosmetic .…any claims or defenses based upon the alleged preeminence of the American flag of peace over any other flag are frivolous and sanctionable.

Slangal v. Cassel  962 F.Supp 1214 (D Neb 1997) [District Court] [Sovereigns]

“I find and conclude that any complaint predicated in whole or in part upon the allegation that jurisdiction is based upon the ‘American Free Flag of Peace, title 4 USC 1’…or a similar allegation is frivolous, malicious and intended to harass. The plaintiff or anyone else who has filed…such a ‘flag’ suit is notified that any such suit filed after this date will be dismissed sua sponte without notice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”

Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932) U.S. Supreme Court [Driving]
     aka Riley vs. Laeson, 142 So. 619

[T]he only limitations found restricting the right of the state to condition the use of the public highways as a means of vehicular transportation for compensation are (1) that the state must not exact of those it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain that they surrender any of their inherent U.S. Constitutional Rights as a condition precedent to obtaining permission for such use….”
(Quoted to me in a YouTube comment)

Googling the “Riley vs Laeson,” and “Riley v Lawson” as well as “142 So. 619” turned up nothing. It appears to be a mis-citation though if anyone finds it please link me up. It appears that at any rate the Riley case was quoting or referencing Stephenson v Binford; I did find Stephenson v Binford. It does not say anything about “surrender [of]…Constitutional rights” and I doubt that Riley, if we ever find it will support that quote. Until I can find the Riley case however I can only consider Stephenson. Here are points from the syllabus:

1. The highways of a State are public property, the primary and preferred use of which is for private purposes; their use for purposes of gain may generally be prohibited by the legislature or conditioned as it sees fit…..

3. Unregulated use of the public highways by a vast and constantly growing number of private contract carriers operating motor trucks had the effect of greatly decreasing the freight which would be carried by railroads within the state, and, in consequence, of adding to the burden upon the highways. Held: (1) That the removal or reduction of this burden, with its resulting injury to the highways, interference with their primary use, danger and inconvenience, was a legitimate subject for the exercise of the legislative power….

4. The judgment of the legislature as to fitness and efficiency of means adopted by it for a legitimate end must stand if it can be seen that, in any degree or under any reasonably conceivable circumstances, there is an actual relation between the means and the end; the legislative conclusion must be accepted by the courts if not manifestly wrong.

Analysis of Stephenson v Binford:

This is a case about whether the Legislature had the power to regulate businesses who were trucking for their own purposes but not as common carriers, without permits and a law that required them to obtain permits for such use, which was causing wear and congestion. From the start we must be clear that the PERMITS involved are not driver licenses of any sort, they are USE permits, granting the right to use the highways for a particular commercial reason.

“[The highways’] use for purposes of gain may generally be prohibited by the legislature or conditioned as it sees fit.”

Opponents of licensing doubtless wish to read this to mean that the Legislature may not do the same with private use. But the rule is that courts don’t make decisions on questions that are not in the case before the court. Since private licenses (again, we are talking USE licenses here not driving licenses) or private use of the highway is not at issue, the Court is making no decision or ruling on that point.

The comment about the primary use of highways is just that, a comment, a bit of context at the most, and “dicta” (“speaking”) not ruling.

This is not in any sense a case that speaks in any way to driver licensing.

But another message of the case is clear: as long as it seeks a legitimate end, any law the legislature makes that bears any conceivable relationship to obtaining that end must be accepted by the courts “if not manifestly wrong.”

In other words the courts do not second guess the policy decision of the Legislature and the Legislature generally has the power to pass what laws it thinks will achieve a legitimate end.

The case affirms the right of the state to regulate a particular aspect of business or commercial use of the highways; it certainly does not consider the question of driver licensing at all.

Further, the 4th syllabus point, sometimes called the “rational review standard,” applies to most law making by the states; and it in fact supports, for reasons of safety, the requirement to be licensed for all drivers. If the legislature finds safety will be improved to any degree it can require licenses and the courts must accept that if it is in any sense whatever possibly correct. (Yes there are limits but they don’t come into play here.)

United States v. Greenstreet, 912 F. Supp. 224, 229 (N.D.Tex. 1996) [Sovereigns]

Defendant Greenstreet’s response…identifies this Court as an “Admiralty Court” without further discussing his allegation…Others have attempted to persuade the judiciary that fringe on an American flag denotes a court of admiralty.To think that a fringed flag adorning the courtroom somehow limits this Court’s jurisdiction is frivolous…Unfortunately for Defendant Greenstreet, decor is not a determinant for jurisdiction.

Attacking the legitimacy of federal reserve notes is not a novel argument. Others have asserted such claims; however, they have been summarily rejected. See, e.g.,Rothacker v. Rockwall County Central Appraisal District, 703 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing state and federal authority declaring federal reserve notes to be legal tender). This Court will also reject Mr. Greenstreet’s coinage arguments. The Court believes that Defendant’s position is simply irrational.

United States v. Kenneth Wayne Leaming, (WD Washington D.C.)
Order, docket entry 102, 2/12/2013, [District Court] [Sovereigns]
[Order of dismissal does not include this cited Order.]

“The Court therefore feels some measure of responsibility to inform Defendant that all the fancy legal-sounding ‘things he has read on the internet’ are make-believe. … at the end of the day, while sovereign citizens and Defendant cite things like ‘Universal Law Ordinances,'[UCC #2012096074] they are subject to both state and federal laws, just like everyone else.” [emphasis in original]

Vella v. McCammon  671 F.Supp 1128 (SD Tex 1987)[District Court] [Sovereigns]

The remaining claims that Petitioner has asserted by way of motion to dismiss, e.g. Court lacking jurisdiction because the Court’s flag has yellow fringes on it, were denied and the Court considers them to have not only been without merit but also to have been totally frivolous. Petitioner’s claims have no arguable basis in law or fact and the appeal is not taken in good faith.

State Courts

Berberian v. Petit (RI, 1977) RHODE ISLAND [Driving]

…It is equally clear that the right to operate a motor vehicle is not a fundamental right. The importance of that right to the individual in modern society does not determine whether it is to be regarded as fundamental for the purpose of review under the equal protection clause. …For equal protection purposes, only rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are fundamental. Id. at 33-34, 93 S. Ct. at 1297, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 43.

The right to operate a motor vehicle is wholly a creation of state law; it certainly is not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, and nothing in that document or in our state constitution has even the slightest appearance of an implicit guarantee of that right. The plaintiff’s argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel …is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right

Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221. Illinois [Driving]

“The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived.”

This is an Illinois Supreme Court decision. Note that the above quote does not say that requiring a driver’s license is unlawful, nor a violation of the right to travel. What it says at the most is that the right to travel can be exercised using highways, which does not imply a right to drive without license. In fact the case is about licensing a bus system to use the public streets.

It isn’t about driver licenses.

“The question for decision is, Has the city the power to prohibit the operation on its streets of motor busses, as common carriers of passengers, by a public utility which has obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity for such operation from the Illinois Commerce Commission?”
 

But sometimes a decision while not in a case on point nevertheless results in legal principles that do apply. However, if you think the case supports the idea that licenses cannot be required you will very disappointed. This is ALSO Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago:

“Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with horses and carriages. (Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31; Ward v. Meredith, 220 id. 66; Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465; Shinkle v. Mc- Cullough, 116 Ky. 960.) Many cases have been decided respecting the validity and construction of statutes and ordinances regulating their use upon public highways, and it has been uniformly held that the State, in the exercise of the police power, may regulate their speed and provide other reasonable rules and restrictions as to their use. (Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542; *206206 Christy v. Elliott, supra; State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517; State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62) Driven by indifferent, careless or incompetent operators these vehicles may be a menace to the safety of the traveling public, and it has been held that under its authority to regulate the use of the streets a city may enact ordinances which may diminish this danger, and for this purpose may regulate the speed of automobiles and repress their careless management. (City of Chicago v. Kluever, 257 Ill. 317; People v. Schneider, 139 Mich. 673; Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, supra; Brazier v. Philadelphia, 215 Pa. St. 297)

…Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience.

A fair reading of that paragraph would be that one way to repress “careless management” of vehicles would include licensing of drivers to ensure they are not “[d]riven by indifferent, careless or incompetent operators…and repress their careless management.”

Carter v. State, 702 S.W.2d 774, 778 (Tex.App.1986) TEXAS [Driving]

Carter argues that he has a constitutional right to travel on the public highways which the legislature may not take away by the requirement of a license. It is true that the right to travel interstate is a fundamental right under the United States Constitution. However, we agree with the Supreme Court of Colorado that the revocation of a driver’s license for violation of the traffic laws of the state does not unconstitutionally burden such right. See Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194, 613 P.2d 884, 887 (1980). We also agree with the holding of the Colorado court that the issuance of a driver’s license does not confer upon the licensee a right that is independently entitled to protection against any and all governmental interference or restriction. Id.

City of Bismarck v. Stuart 546 N.W.2d 366, 367 (N.D.1996) NORTH DAKOTA [Driving]

“Stuart argues that he has a constitutional right to operate an automobile on public roads without a driver’s license. No court has ever held that it is an impermissible infringement upon a citizen’s constitutional Right to Travel for the Legislature to decree that, unless exempted by statute, every person who operates a motor vehicle on public roads must have a valid operator’s license …The Legislature has the constitutional police power to ensure safe drivers and safe roads.

City of Salina v. Wisden (Utah 1987) 737 P2d 981 UTAH [Driving]

“Mr. Wisden’s assertion that the right to travel encompasses ‘the unrestrained use of the highway’ is wrong.  The right to travel granted by the state and federal constitutions does not include the ability to ignore laws governing the use of public roadways.  The motor vehicle code was promulgated to increase the safety and efficiency of our public roads.  It enhances rather than infringes on the right to travel. The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public roadway is not a fundamental right  it is a privilege that is granted upon the compliance with the statutory licensing procedures and may be revoked…

“Mr. Wisden’s contention [is] that the … court lacked jurisdiction to try him because his status as a “free man” exempts him from the motor vehicle code because he did not consent to be bound by it. We address this issue only because it is frequently raised and should be finally settled. We reject his claim. All of the provisions violated by Mr. Wisden regulate the conduct of persons. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-1(t) defines “person” as “[e]very natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation.” Mr. Wisden is a natural person and is therefore bound by the statutes he violated. Consent to laws is not a prerequisite to their enforceability against individuals. We take issue with Mr. Wisden’s assertion that “this type of legislation attempts to lead one to the conclusion that all are subject to the law, and amounts to nothing more than legal debauchery.”

In order for our scheme of ordered liberties to succeed, we must all obey valid laws, even those with which we do not agree; a man cannot exempt himself from the operation of a law simply by declaring that he does not consent to have it apply to him.

Commonwealth v. Appel 438 Pa. Super. 214 (1994) 652 A.2d 341 PENNSYLVANIA [Driving][Sovereigns]

Appellant… was found guilty of driving eighty-five miles an hour in a fifty-five mile an hour zone …. Without setting forth any support for her position, Appellant argues that because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was a party to this action, original jurisdiction to decide this matter rests with the United States Supreme Court. Finding no basis for this argument, we hold that it is wholly without merit.

….Because Appellant’s offense did not carry a penalty of imprisonment, she clearly was not entitled to a jury trial….

Appellant also argues that she was denied her right to be represented by counsel. This is a misstatement. In fact, the trial court inquired as to whether Appellant wanted to be represented by counsel. She responded that she wished to be represented by an individual who had accompanied her to court but was not a licensed attorney. The court properly rejected the request.

Another assertion raised by Appellant is that the Commonwealth failed to prove the elements of the crime for which she was charged. … the Commonwealth clearly established beyond a reasonable doubt that she was driving at an excessive speed.

Appellant erroneously (and curiously) cites to a repealed state tax provision for the proposition that the Commonwealth can only accept payment for fines in gold or silver coins. Appellant does not formulate any argument regarding this claim and, therefore, we will not elaborate on it any further.

… Appellant argues that the gold fringe adorning the American flag displayed in the district justice’s courtroom conferred Admiralty/Maritime jurisdictionthis is a preposterous claim...

By filing the present appeal seeking review of frivolous issues, Appellant has caused this court to waste precious judicial resources. Appellant’s total disregard for the court system as a whole began in the trial court and has carried over to this court…we award the Commonwealth reasonable attorneys fees and costs

Commonwealth v Levy  194 Pa. Superior Ct. 390 (1961) PENNSYLVANIA [Driving]

A license to operate a motor vehicle on public highways is a privilege and not a property right.

Coyle v. State, 775 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App. 1989) TEXAS [Driving]

Coyle maintains that driving a motor vehicle is an inalienable and unregulatable “right” which may not be interfered with by the State of Texas. She argues that it is contrary to the federal constitution for the State of Texas to require a private citizen to secure a driver’s license before operating a motor vehicle on a public roadway….Although Coyle has put forth a good deal of time and energy vehemently arguing this point, it is clear that in Texas, a license or permit to drive an automobile on the public highways and streets is a privilege and not property or a property right. This privilege is subject to reasonable regulations under the police power in the interest of the welfare and safety of the general public. …. Coyle argues the State failed to define “driving” and “operating.” She claims harm in the fact that these words were used interchangeably at trial and in the charging instruments. These terms are synonymous; there is no error.

Galan v. State, 301 S.W.2d 141, (1957). TEXAS [Driving]

Appellant next complains of that portion of the court’s charge in which he instructed the jury that they might convict if they found that the appellant did “drive and operate” a motor vehicle on the grounds that the complaint and information charged only that he did “operate” a motor vehicle. We hold such terms to be synonymous, and the court’s charge to be proper.

Gordon v Beddard, 265 Mass 408 (1929) Massachusetts [Driving]

“The statute was passed to make the roads more safe and convenient for travelers by preventing unlicensed persons from operating motor vehicles thereon. The purpose of licensing operators of automobiles is to make it reasonably certain that the licensee is qualified for the task and a proper person to be licensed. Negligent operation of an automobile endangering the safety of other travelers is likely to follow if an unlicensed person is given complete control of its operation.”

House v. Cramer, 1 12 N. W. 3; 134 Iowa 374 (1907) IOWA [Driving]

The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel along the highways of the state, is no longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some vehicle.

House v Cramer is a 1907 Iowa Supreme Court case which says indeed that automobiles can use the roads. The case had to do with whether the driver of a car in 1904 was liable for scaring horses because when he stopped, not realizing horses were tied up nearby, he failed to suppress the spark and thus the sound of his engine. The horses apparently bolted at the sound, causing damage to property and themselves.

The court further said:

Assuming the law to be well settled by our decisions that one operating an automobile has the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses and is liable for the resulting accident only where he fails to use the degree of care as to speed and management of his machine which the circumstances reasonably require…

The heart of the opinion of the court is that drivers can indeed be held liable (but that the evidence did not show this driver had been negligent).

In Re White 97 Cal.App.3d.141, 158 Cal.Rptr. 562, 566-67 (1979) CALIFORNIA [Sovereigns]

Like all constitutional rights the right of free movement is not absolute and may be reasonably restricted in the public interest.

Luk v Commonwealth, 421 Mass 415 (1995) Massachusetts [Driving]

Continued possession of this privilege is conditioned on obedience to the Legislature’s comprehensive regulatory scheme aimed at regulating the motorways and keeping them safe. The first statute requiring drivers’ licenses was promulgated in 1903. Even then, one could obtain a driver’s license only on “passing such examination as to his qualifications as may be required by the state highway commission,”

Maine v. Pelletier (ME, 2015) Supreme Court of Maine citing among others State v Pelletier  MAINE [Driving]

“…the only issues on appeal are whether the court below had jurisdiction to enforce the laws of the State of Maine against Pelletier and whether the requirement that each driver hold a valid driver’s license violates the United States Constitution

“Because these arguments, although frivolous , are raised with some regularity, we write to provide an *unambiguous declaration that Maine’s courts have jurisdiction to enforce Maine’s laws against those physically present within the state’s geographic bounds* and to reaffirm the constitutionality of Maine’s law requiring each driver to hold a valid driver’s license .
[And in this 3½ page decision the Court showed jurisdiction and Constitutionality. One of the simplest and most easily read cases you could find.]

People [of Colorado] v. Drew, Colo Court of Appeals (May 17, 2010) [Sovereigns]

Defendant pled guilty to first-degree kidnapping and conspiracy to distribute a schedule II controlled substance. His argument on appeal was that he was born Donald James Drew, and the person charged in this matter was named in capital letters as DONALD JAMES DREW. Thus, defendant argued that he was convicted as an artificial person and was denied due process. Claims so premised are patently frivolous and without merit.

Roberto v Department of Public Utilities  262 Mass. 583, 587 (Mass. 1928) Massachusetts [Driving]

“The constitutionality of the statute is settled. The Commonwealth has power to prescribe the conditions under which public ways may be used by motor vehicles, and can delegate the administration of such power …The department is given authority to prescribe the time during which the rights granted may be exercised. ….The certificate was a privilege. It was neither a contract nor property, and its revocation deprived the petitioner of no vested rights…”

Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal 2d 488 CALIFORNIA [Driving]

–“No statutory duty lies to apply for, or to possess a driver license for personal travel and transportation as defendant is not within the class of persons for whose benefit or protection the statute was enacted.”–

No.  That quote is fake.  It is not anywhere in the Routh v. Quinn opinion. The case is about a claim made due to the tax redemption sale of a dehydrating plant. It says nothing relevant to travel or driving.

Self v. Rhay 61 Wn.2d 261 (1963)377 P.2d 885 [Sovereigns]

“The common law is the real law, the supreme Law of the land, the code, rules, regulations, policy and statutes are “not the law”

Well that seems clear enough; this quote also is offered to support the idea that statutes are not laws. The problem is that Self v. Rhay says no such thing. The quote is fraudulent. Those words are not there. Nothing like that is in the decision. 

State v. Davis (Mo.App 1988) 745 SW2d 249 Missouri [Driving]

Davis next contends that he was not operating a motor vehicle, but was merely “travelling in a conveyance” when arrested, and therefore, he did not violate the statute. His reasoning for this premise that the statute in question is for the purpose of regulating commerce and has no application to individuals who are merely “travelling,” is not based on any relevant statute or case precedent, and has no merit…the operation of a motor vehicle upon public highways is a privilege, or at the most a qualified right, it is properly controlled by the exercise of state police power…. In the exercise of such police power, a state may require a person to be licensed as a condition precedent to operating a motor vehicle upon public highways. Williams v. Schaffner, 477 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. Banc 1972)… Since Davis was in actual physical control of the pickup truck, he was operating a motor vehicle.

State v Booher (TN 1997) TENNESSEE [Driving]

    …the appellant asserts that the State of Tennessee has unduly infringed upon his “right to travel” by requiring licensing and registration of his motor vehicles prior to operation on the public roadways of this state… at no time did the State of Tennessee place constraints upon the appellant’s exercise of this right.   His right to travel within this state or to points beyond its boundaries remains unimpeded … Requiring persons to obtain a driver’s license and to register their automobiles with the State provides a means of identifying the owner of the automobile if negligently operated to the damage of other persons…because it is a means of guaranteeing a minimal level of driver competence, licensing improves safety on our highways and, thus, protects and enhances the well being of the residents and visitors of our state. Thus, our state legislature may properly within the scope of its police power enact reasonable regulations requiring licensing and registration.

…the appellant presents additional arguments relating to whether his automobile is a “motor vehicle” … whether he is exempted from such regulations because of his “use” of his automobile;  and whether he is required to obtain a Tennessee driver’s license…The appellant’s 1985 Dodge Daytona is a motor vehicle contemplated by the regulations, said vehicle is driven upon the public roads of this state…These issues are without merit.

State [Minnesota] v. Cuypers, 559 N.W.2d 435, 436-37 (Minn.App.1997) [Driving]

This case is cited in State v Hershberger; (State’s mandatory automobile insurance laws do not violate constitutional right to travel or to due process);

State [KANSAS] v. Hershberger (KS, 2000)  [Driving]

Hershberger argues that the State had no authority to charge him with driving on a suspended license because he was using his car for personal and not commercial purposes.   Hershberger’s argument seems to be that because he has a constitutional right to travel, he can drive on all public streets and highways without complying with any regulation when he uses his vehicle only for personal purposes. Hershberger has cited no statute which exempts him from the requirement of having a driver’s license if he operates a motor vehicle on the public roadways. Instead, he essentially contends these statutes violate his constitutional right to travel.

These laws were not designed to deter interstate or intrastate migration, nor do they penalize someone for exercising the right to travel. States have a compelling interest in ensuring that motor vehicles are operated in a safe fashion on public roads and highways.   Therefore, States may adopt “[a]ny appropriate means ․ to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway” without violating due process.

“It is elementary that the right to operate a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway is not a natural or unrestrained right but a privilege which is subject to reasonable regulations under the police power of the state in the interest of the public’s safety and welfare. “ (Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 [1961].)   The driver’s license is not a contract or a property right … The privilege is granted to those who are qualified, who comply with reasonable police power requirements in the interest of public safety and welfare, and is withheld from those who do not.
Appellate courts across the country have rejected the type of argument Hershberger raises. The reasoning in these cases is two-fold.   First, regulations pertaining to licensing and registration of vehicles do not deter one’s right to travel because operating a car is only one of many ways to travel.   Second, these courts recognize the purpose of such regulations is to advance the public interest in ensuring the competency of drivers operating on the roadway and that drivers have adequate financial security to compensate potential injured parties.   For these reasons, these regulatory schemes have consistently been held constitutional

STATE  [MAINE] v. PELLETIER•587 A.2d 1100, (Me. 1991)  [Driving]

… the right to . . . “use the public streets . . . is not an absolute and unqualified right. It is subject to be limited and controlled by the sovereign authority — the State, whenever necessary to provide for and promote the safety, peace, health, morals, and general welfare of the people. To secure these and kindred benefits is the purpose of organized government, and to that end may the power of the State, called its police power, be used. By exercise of that power, through legislative enactments, individuals may be subjected to restraints . . . if manifestly necessary to . . . secure and advance the safety, comfort and prosperity of its people. And it is a fundamental law that no constitutional guarantee is violated by such an exercise of the police power of the State when manifestly necessary and tending to secure such general and public benefits.

(In those two Maine rulings we see the courts dismiss the idea that the State is not sovereign and affirm it has jurisdiction over any person within its boundaries; then go on to show that the use of the police power is the basis of license laws and does not violate the constitution. The 2015 decision also quotes the US Supreme Court in Hendrick v.Maryland and Neff v Penoyer both cited above.)

State v. Saunders Cr. ID No. 1008019055 Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

…Defendant’s claims challenging the flag in the courtroom are without merit… Around the country, courts have dealt with disgruntled litigants who have argued that their respective proceedings were illegal or unconstitutional because the court displayed a flag with yellow or gold fringe in the courtroom …All the courts addressing arguments that yellow or gold fringe on a courtroom-displayed flag affects a court’s jurisdiction have explicitly rejected those arguments. These cases have gone so far as to label such arguments as “frivolous,” “totally frivolous,” “preposterous,” and “indisputably meritless.” …The fringe is not regarded as an integral part of the flag and its presence does not constitute an unauthorized addition to the design prescribed by statute. The placing of a fringe on the flag is neither required nor prohibited by law. From a historical and legal standpoint, the use of the fringe on the flag has no inherent or established symbolism. It has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court. It is purely a decorative addition to enhance the appearance of the flag. …Even if the military does display United States flags surrounded by yellow fringe, the presence of yellow fringe does not necessarily turn every such flag into a flag of war. Far from it. In flag manufacture a fringe is not considered to be part of the flag, and it is without heraldic or legal significance …. Jurisdiction is a matter of law, statute, and constitution, not a child’s game wherein one’s power is magnified or diminished by the display of some magic talisman. The flag displayed in the courtroom did not affect the validity or legality of Defendant’s plea and/or sentence.

State [Montana] v. Skurdal  767 P.2d 304  (MT, 1988) [Driving]

“We reject Skurdal’s claim that because he owes nothing on his car (private property) and is not engaged in commercial travel, his liberty interests are infringed by stopping his vehicle. That claim is baseless in Montana, and we find no law in any other jurisdiction to support it either. We will not entertain it further.  We hold… it is a proper exercise of the State’s Police Power to require a valid driver’s license before one may operate a motor vehicle on the public highways.

Spokane v Port, 716 P.2d 945.(1986) [Washington]  [Driving]

Ms. Port contends RCW 46.20.021 [is] unconstitutional as applied to her because [it] improperly restrict[s] her right to travel upon the public highways.

It is well settled that the United States Constitution protects an individual’s right to travel. This fundamental constitutional right applies both to interstate and intrastate travel. Ms. Port attempts to extend this fundamental rule, alleging she has a right, rather than privilege, to operate a motor vehicle upon public highways and streets. …driving an automobile on our state’s public highways is a privilege and not a right because the activity is limited to a certain class of individuals, generally those over the age of 16 years, who have passed a driver’s license examination….This privilege is always subject to such reasonable regulation and control as the proper authorities see fit to impose under the police power in the interest of public safety and welfare.See State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash. 2d 872, 880, 514 P.2d 1052 (1973) (one does not have an absolute constitutional right to a particular mode of travel)See Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 86 L. Ed. 21, 62 S. Ct. 24 (1941). In Reitz, the United States Supreme Court examined the privilege to travel on our public streets and highways and concluded, in 314 U.S. at 36:

Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process.

“….RCW 46.20.021 requires a license to drive or operate a motor vehicle upon our state highways. Licensing is a means by which the State may determine whether vehicle operators have acquired a minimal standard of competence. Mandating driver competence is a public purpose within the police power of the state because it furthers the interests of public safety and welfare. …Ms. Port claims she is constitutionally entitled to this special status because she is not engaged in commercial travel….[she] claims the state licensing statute applies only to commercial operators of motor vehicles. She claims since she was not engaged in the business of transportation, she did not violate the act.”

“RCW 46.20.021, reads: “No person . . . may drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless the person has a valid driver’s license issued under the provisions of this chapter.”

Ms. Port’s argument that this provision requires a license only for those operating commercial vehicles is clearly without merit. RCW 46.04.370 eliminates any alleged ambiguity with respect to the violation here because the section defines an operator or driver as “every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Since Ms. Port was in actual physical control of her vehicle when stopped, she came under the provisions of RCW Title 46.”
(Review denied by [Washington] Supreme Court July 8, 1986.)

Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579 Virginia [Driving]

“The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

Often wrongly cited, this is not a U.S. Supreme Court decision, it is a Virginia Supreme Court decision.

A law was challenged which gave the Chief of Police power to suspend or revoke licenses at will.  This court held that licenses could not be arbitrarily granted or withheld — not that they could not be required at all.  Just the opposite in fact.  The part of the opinion that ‘supports’ the theory has been cherry-picked and the part of the decision that actually supports licensing is overlooked or deliberatelyperry concealed. This is why entire decisions must be read…

With regard to the right of the government to require licensing or permits to drive, you can see it is squarely on point and completely supports licensing requirements:

“A city may, in the exercise of its police power, invest its administrative and executive officers with a reasonable discretion in the performance of duties devolved upon them to that end, whenever it is necessary for the safety and welfare of the public.” …

[1, 2] …The power of a city to control and regulate the use of its streets is a continuing power to be exercised as often and whenever the city may think proper. …The issuance and revocation of such permits by a city is merely a means of exercising the police power of the State delegated to the city to regulate the use of the public highways in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The Constitution of Virginia expressly provides that “the exercise of the police power of the State shall never be abridged.” (Constitution Virginia, section 159.)…

[6-8] The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways … includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon…

[9]  The exercise of such a common right the city may, under its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare…

[10]  The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking, under rules of general application, permits to drive an automobile on its streets...

I can go further. The right to travel, it says is a common law right. While I think the Supreme Court has now accorded it a higher standard, that of a Constitutional right, if it is only a common law right it can be taken away by statute (Meister v. Moore 96 U.S. 76 (1877)) and the right to travel can be regulated (Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116, 125; Schactman v. Dulles 96 App DC 287, 225 F2d 938, at 94)

Wingfield v Fielder 20 ca. 3d 213 (1972)[California]  [Driving]

Per a number of sites:
The court makes it clear that a license relates to qualifications to engage in profession, business, trade or calling; thus, when merely traveling without compensation or profit, outside of business enterprise or adventure with the corporate state, no license is required of the natural individual traveling for personal business, pleasure and transportation.”

The problem with this case is (yet again) those words do not appear anywhere in the decision . In fact this is case in which a commercial pilot is suing for the reissuance of a license. As such it (a) has nothing to do with driving (b) is in support of licenses and (c) explicitly involves commercial activity.

WHY do they give fake quotes if there position is so true?

Other

California Constitution Article IV Section 8 (b) (1) [Sovereigns]

“The Legislature may make no law except by statute and may enact no statute except by bill.”

In dismissing a suit for the refund of all federal income tax, social security, and Medicare contributions withheld from the plaintiff’s wages between 1993 and 1994, Judge Kimba Wood wrote:

“Plaintiff thus appears to argue that this Court should look to principles of natural law, or more accurately, his preferred principles of natural law, as opposed to the positive law by which it is bound. That, however, is not this province of this Court.”

What is a State?

First, States of the United States are not states under international law but are states within the framework of the US Constitution… states in international terms are:

Klinghoffer v. SNC Achille Lauro 937 F.2d 44 (1991)

“Entities that have a defined territory and a permanent population, that are under the control of their own government, and that engage in, or have the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”

…under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the “FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1988)… this Court has limited the definition of “state” to “`entit[ies] that ha[ve] a defined territory and a permanent population, [that are] under the control of [their] own government, and that engage[] in, or ha[ve] the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.'”  National Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 201 (1987)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081, 109 S.Ct. 1535, 103 L.Ed.2d 840 (1989).

More at Duhaimes Law Dictionary.

 

=                                  More Blogs by Philipem 1000                                  =

Sovereign Citizens and Fellow Travelers
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fD

Sovereign Citizens and the Jurisdictional Gambit:
You Can’t Touch Me!
https://wp.me/p3nYC8-1q5
( Also See
Compendium of Cases )

=                                                          The Law                                                          =
Sources Of Law and Authority
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fF
Are Statutes Laws?  What About Regulations ?
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-Od
Strawman Theory and CAPITAL Letters
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-TB
.
=                                                  The US and the States                                                =
 The United States Is A Corporation
(Or If You Prefer, It Can Be An Elephant
)
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fK
The US Became Bankrupt in 1933
& Federal Reserve Notes are Not Legal Currency
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fO
The United States is still a British Colony  http://wp.me/p3nYC8-kz
There are Three United States
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fX
.
=                                                 The Courts                                                     =
A Lost 13th Amendment to the Constitution Removes all Legitimacy from Courts; Judges hold Illegal Titles from the King/Queen
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-kI
All US Courts are Courts of Admiralty and hear only Admiralty Cases
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fV
US Courts are, well, not Admiralty after all, but instead Equity Courts
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-l2
US Courts are Administrative, Not Judicial
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fR
All Lawyers take a Secret Oath to Hide ‘The TRUTH
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-l2
Posted in Sovereign Citizen Crackpot Theories | Tagged | Leave a comment

Philipem 1000 – Guide to Blogs

Shortlink: http://wp.me/p3nYC8-106

October 2017 Updated May 15 2018 – This will be sort of a table of contents or index to assist you in finding what blog contains what information.

These are not precise guides to the organization of each Blog, but key phrases to give you an idea of what is discussed in each blog.

Sovereign Citizens and Fellow Travelers
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fD

Introduction to the Sovereign Citizen Concept
(There is no such thing in our Legal Tradition)
What is Sovereignty?
We The People or I The Person?
What’s Wrong With Individual Sovereignty?
What Do Courts Say?

Sovereign Citizens and the Jurisdictional Gambit:
You Can’t Touch Me!
https://wp.me/p3nYC8-1q5
( Also See
Compendium of Cases )

.

 
=                                                          The Law                                                          =
.
.

Claimed: “Common Law” is the Supreme Law of the Land
Claimed: “Rules, Regulations, Statutes are Not Legal or
Only Govern the Government not The People

What is the law?

The Rule of Law — More Than Just A Rule

.
Sources of Law:

The Constitution
The State Constitutions
Statutory Law (Statutes, Ordinances, Codes)
Case Law (AKA Common Law)

Not a Source of Law:
Natural Law
Rules and Regulations

Are Statutes Laws?  What About Regulations ?
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-Od

So What Are Laws?
Statutes — are they laws?
About Codes
About Regulations
 .
The Strawman Theory
Latin Had ONLY Capitals!
The Courts Do Not Agree
.
A collection of court cases
  quoted regularly in response to sovereign citizen
ideas and challenges to the driver license laws.
 .

=                             The US and the States                            =

The United States Is A Corporation
(Or If You Prefer, It Can Be An Elephant
)
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fK
.
Claimed: The United States is a Corporation, Not a Sovereign Nation
Claimed: There is no nation, it never was, the Constitution
created a corporation from the beginning.
 .
“DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ACT OF 1871 Theory”
Claimed: In 1871 The Congress created a commercial charter/Constitution
for the US, and made us into a corporation headquartered in the
District of Columbia, not a nation & therefore…
The Constitution used now is not the same one adopted in 1791.
Did Anyone Actually Read that law?
CAPITALIZATION Did Not Happen!
Where’s the New Constitution?
.
Constitution FOR vs Constitution OF
Where is the corporation called THE UNITED STATES?
The Constitution refers to itself as “The Constitution of the United States”
.

The Adjournment of 1861
Claimed:The Congress of 1861 adjourned and was dissolved
and all acts of Congress thereafter are invalid
(“the President …may, on extraordinary occasions,
convene both Houses, or either of them”)

.
Claimed: 28 USC 3002 proves the US is a corporation
(Talk About Word Salad and Mr Magoo Legal Research!)

..

Federal Zone Theory
Claimed: The US government only has authority over
Federal Lands and Possessions
(Except for Article IV Sec 3 …)

 .
.

 

Claimed:
(1) US is bankrupt;
(2) So the states lost sovereign power
(3) The U.S. lost its sovereignty
(4) US Became a corporation (or already was)
(5) Your relationship with corporations contractual only.
(6) Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) controls it all.

.

The “Traficant Speech”
Former Congressman and Federal Convict James Trafficant speaks
(With Interspersed Rebuttals)
.
What IS the UCC?
What It’s NOT
UCC started 1952 not 1933
Not a Federal law.
Not a Law unless adopted in your state
Some States did not adopt it
Some made changes
Applies only to businesses and commercial activity

.

 

 

Claimed:
(1) We lost the Revolution
(2) We won but we gave up what we won
(3) War of 1812 was British attempt to stop the “13th Amendment
(4) Because the South lost the Civil War we don’t own anything, and all our taxes go to the King.

There are Three United States
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fX

Claimed: There are Actually Three United States
Learn to Read…

.

=                                           The Courts                                               =

.

Does The “Real” 13th Amendment Eliminate the Courts?
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-kI

The claim: There is an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that disqualifies every lawyer in the country from being a citizen, and thereby from serving as a judge. It was never ratified

 

BUT if the Amendment had been ratified, so what?
Esquire is Neither a Title of Honor Nor of Nobility.
It does not come from a foreign power
Not Enough States Ratified
Publication is not Ratification
The Courts have already considered and rejected these arguments.

What about the BAR??

 
.
.
What is Admiralty Law?

“The Admiralty Courts Exist Because
the U.S. is Under Martial Law”

U.S. Is NOT Under Martial Law and the Courts are Not Suspended,
Nor Acting in any Admiralty or Military Capacity.
Martial Law Does Not Suspend the Courts

Does The Jones Act Put Us Under Maritime/Admiralty Law
By Our Birth Certificate?
Why Is Your Name Spelled In CAPITALS?
.
.The Currency Proposition:

Claimed: The US No Longer circulates Gold and Silver
Based Currency and/or Coin, Therefore We Are Governed by The Law Of The Sea
.

The Flag Fringe Proposition:

Claimed: The Gold Fringe on the Flag Shows
That The Court is An Admiralty/Military Court

.

.
What Law says you have to have a license?
Driver License Laws.
Are You A Person?
What Does it Mean “To Drive”
Is Your Car A Motor Vehicle?
What is a Highway?
“But I saw a video where the cops let this guy go…”
The Arguments Against Licenses
Laws and Statutes
The Right To Travel
It’s a Car Not a Motor Vehicle
Licenses are only required for Commerce
Federal Law Preempted State Law
You Must Consent to Licensing / The State is a Corporation
Court Cases Cited Against Licensing
Court Cases That Support Licensing
Summary
Posted in Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Clinton, Trump, Nukes, and Classified Emails

http://wp.me/p3nYC8-Up

I write this in the heat of the Presidential Campaign, where Trump and his supporters are attacking Secretary Clinton about her emails, about classified information handling, and Trump is being attacked as too dangerous to possess the nuclear codes.

For background information I served in the USAF a number of years and had access to missile silos and command posts but was not in the chain of command for launching them. I knew of some of the training crews received.

I also spent substantial time dealing with Top Secret / Special Intelligence and Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence (SCI) including work under the NSA; worked in Air Force Special Security Offices; and received very extensive training in the handling of classified material. Much has doubtless changed but the basics seem to be pretty much the same.

Can President Trump Launch Nukes All By Himself?

As Trump has been attacked for his lack of composure and judgement and looking like a loose cannon, one defense has been offered that if he tried to launch nukes others in the chain of command would act to stop him from doing so rashly. Unfortunately there is not even a little truth to that.

Can Any President Launch nukes all by himself?

That’s a little complicated.

Legally the answer is yes.

The President has the legal authority; the 1986  Goldwater-Nichols Act, made the chain of command for conducting military operations go from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands and thus bypasses the Joint Chiefs of Staff completely.

Practically, the answer is no, not quite. He needs a little help.

Only the President can direct the use of nuclear weapons. While the President does have unilateral authority as commander-in-chief to order that nuclear weapons be used for any reason at any time, the actual procedures and technical systems in place for authorizing the execution of a launch order require confirmation by the Secretary of Defense If the Secretary of Defense does not concur, then the President may in his sole discretion fire the Secretary. The Secretary of Defense has legal authority to approve the order, but cannot veto it.

All of the systems used in authorization are kept away from hands of any one person, the concept of “No Lone Zone” or “the two man rule” means that no one can be unaccompanied in an area that contains these systems for example or launch without the assistance and concurrence of a second person. So in a silo both the commander and his deputy commander must turn their launch keys more or less simultaneously for example.

As respects the President he has a military aide who is nearby at all times and has physical custody of the launch codes and the systems needed to communicate them. But for the President to use them the Secretary of Defense must be the second person authorizing.

If an unbalanced or rash or rogue President orders the Nukes Launched, can people in the chain of command — or anyone — stop those orders?

No.

If the Secretary of Defense refuses the President can fire him on the spot and get an Assistant Secretary to do the job. As long as the President has hired the right yes men they will agree. He can keep firing people as did Richard Nixon in the Justice Department until he finds a Robert Bork who will act even if he disagrees with the launch.

Once the President has entered the order and it is confirmed what happens after that is automatic. The orders are sent through multiple redundant communication systems to every silo, ship, and aircraft that is involved. No single person is in the chain at a point where they could intercept or stop those orders.

The recipients may hesitate. But be not deceived, most of them are well trained to take and follow those orders. Every month or perhaps more often there are drills in which they simulate launching. Personnel are observed and graded and tested in this; and never at any point are they led to think or permitted to advocate for the idea that they have any legitimate role in blocking, stopping, or delaying that launch as long as the orders are authentic. Anyone who does might be retrained, reprimanded, or removed from their positions. They take pride in following the toughest orders any human could get. If the President orders a strike they will execute to the best of their ability.

They don’t need to, or expect to, know why the order was issued, they will do it anyway. They are trained to execute and not to question. You may indeed find someone who does delay or question or refuse, but the vast number will comply, at the most checking to be sure the order is authentic.

Secretary Clinton’s Classified Emails

The topic of her emails is so wide ranging; I’ve not been interested enough to read most of it since I think it’s mostly a tempest in a teapot; what they show is normal if not admirable political behavior, not corruption, and if we looked at the RNC emails we’d see the same things IMHO.  President Bush destroyed 22 million emails from a private server owned by the RNC and illegally used that server to conduct official business as President.

I will focus only on the security aspects because my knowledge can add to that discussion. But there’s a lot to that and it requires attention to details.

Early on Secretary Clinton claimed that she never used her private server system for sending or receiving classified material. While the FBI has shown that is not completely correct, it is my opinion that she honestly believed it. The FBI says she was extremely careless in handling the material and that it appears she did not recognize “obvious” markings of classified material –and that she did not lie to the FBI about this.

Surely many will take issue with aspects of those claims; I will simply apply my knowledge to my understanding of the events and show why I believe she could be honest and did not deserve more than a reprimand.

I have not studied all there is to know here; but at the end of the investigation it was stated that a relatively few classified documents among tens of thousands of emails  were in fact received and/ or forwarded through her email. I have excluded here any emails that contained information which was classified AFTER the fact, after it was sent.

Who it was sent to could matter. If it is sent to someone without a clearance that’s a bigger issue than sending it to a person with clearance but no authorization. And sending it to a person with clearance and authorization is an issue only because the system was not a secure one.

I have not heard the FBI spoke of any unauthorized or uncleared recipients. So she may have sent classified material to people allowed to see it but not through a secure system; the security breach is that it was sent via a non-secure system.

Secure/Non Secure System

When I say non-secure system I am using government speak. It does not mean that the system lacked security measures or would or necessarily could have been penetrated. It simply means that the equipment, software, hardware, and techniques were not approved by NSA for the storage or transmission of classified information.

Secure systems typically use encryption that is devised and approved by the NSA generally. They have technical features that make it difficult to intercept stray signals before they are encrypted.

Given that her premises were protected  by the Secret Service it is unlikely that they were physically insecure, subject to physical invasion or theft.

I was intimately familiar with the systems and procedures a few decades back. The principles have not changed much even though the hardware and software have.

For someone to be guilty of compromising information (what we called a “security violation” in my day) they must know that material is classified. They don’t necessarily need to intend to disclose it but it has to be that they knew it was a classified.

Ms Clinton has claimed that she did not receive much or any training on the handling of classified information. That is at odds with my experience but (a) I was in the Air Force, Department of Defense not State; and (b) I had almost a year of training before I actually worked in my career field, during which I received much classified handling training and then was later given follow up and additional training pertinent to the types of duty and the information I had access to.

I doubt that the government affords the Secretary of State weeks months or even days for training on the job. Most people who get to that office probably have had some background in handling and seeing such material. But formal training being zero is not hard for me to imagine. It’s a mistake but it is quite likely in my view. I suspect the same is true of her work as First Lady which would have involved some access; and as a Senator —  there, perhaps, I would expect some real training but the Congressional agencies that handle such things have not said a word.

Classification Levels and Markings

Usually one recognizes classified information because it is clearly marked as such. So the actual marking of documents becomes pretty significant in this story. I have provided as examples some actual declassified documents to help illustrate my points.

Most documents are mixtures of classified and unclassified material. Classified material itself is designated as Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret in ascending order of importance.

The classification of a document is the highest level of any information in it. The classification of a page, likewise.

In addition to classifications the distribution of and access to material is often restrictd by special designations, commonly “Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)” is identified with a specific codeword for that “compartment” and a special background investigation is needed for people to have access.

For example (and I make this up, it may or may not be a codeword; often the codeword itself is classified), I might have intelligence from a specific agent, and that information may be given the codeword “Atlas”. People in the know understand whether or not to depend on “Atlas” to provide reliable information.  Only persons authorized to see SCI designation “Atlas” can see it regardless of their clearance level. To see it you must be ‘read into’ the Atlas program (given an orientation about the codeword and special procedures) and can only talk or share Atlas information with other Atlas cleared personnel. You may see the info but not be told who Atlas is. You only get to see items for which you’re both cleared, and by duty, have a need to know.

Marking of classified material is significant to this issue.

Every document is supposed to be marked with the highest classification prominently on its cover. Each page must be marked with its highest classification at the top, bottom or both. A page with mixed information may have a designation on every paragraph showing that paragraph‘s classification so (C) or (S) or (TS) [actually I’m not sure it’s T or TS] shows the classification level; or (U) for unclassified information.

Many documents would not use and some would not need the paragraph markers.

While I know in theory about the paragraphs I don’t recall the practice in my day. It is actually not uncommon for documents not to have them.

Let’s Look At Examples

I offer two examples.

The first is a multi-page document about encryption equipment and planning its deployment for the US Navy; click the link to see the document.   TSEC/KG-13 Pontus

The document was overall SECRET – CRYPTO  (Crypto means something do with codes and requires a separate special authorization to access) as is marked on its front cover.

Page B-2 is marked top and bottom as Unclassified, the next two pages are marked Confidential and the last three are Secret. The document as a whole is Secret; parts of it are correctly and explicitly marked. No paragraph markings are given and it is possible that some of the items on a particular page are classified and others are not. The classifying authority didn’t show us that.

The second document is now declassified and was also Secret; I only provide one page:

niger-drone-base-page-1-p1-normal

Note that the markings on this document are the word SECRET stamped top and bottom. This is how most classified documents are marked. This is doubtless what Ms. Clinton would have looked for to see if something was classified.

Also note that every paragraph on this page is marked (U) for unclassified. So the marking on the page is actually wrong. This page is not and never was Secret classified info. It is and was Unclassified.

Secretary Clinton

In a relatively few emails FBI found paragraphs with (C) or higher markings. Some were not classified at the time, but have been classified since.

I have the impression the emails are longer documents with a  few classified paragraphs presenting the risk.

I can’t be absolutely sure because of course being classified they are not published; I haven’t (and most of the critics haven’t) seen them.

What is clear is that she only had paragraph markings available to guide her (because the FBI specifically referred to them, not to page markings which would as you can see are much more obvious) and she says she was unaware of their significance.

Did she type those paragraphs, markings and all, into an email? Unlikely; if she added the info to an email she probably cut and pasted from something else, perhaps a document or an email or a memo sent to her. The document or  page classification probably was not visible or present in the source at all. We don’t know. They may have been part of a longer email chain she got and added to.

Indeed she may have not have noticed markings at all and if she did she could easily have not understood them. If she had little or no training, that is quite possible; if the emails were long it is possible there too that she didn’t notice them.

If she cut and pasted from unclassified sections and didn’t realize she was also taking classified sections it is easily possible. If it was sent to her it is probable.

I myself would have looked for page markings and might not have noticed the paragraph markers.

She said she did not know, and I have no reason to think she is being dishonest, that these were classified documents. Without the header or footer it’s easy to overlook. Without training it is easy to not know.

Mishandling Error or Crime?

Finally, much has been made of the observation that the law does not require specific intent to mishandle classified information. If you accidental compromise information you could theoretically be prosecuted.

But it doesn’t work that way in the real world.

Security violations, sadly, are commonplace.

Failing to lock your stuff up, cover it when you have visitors, take proper inventory, change combinations when someone transfers out of an office, take it someplace it isn’t supposed to be, saying the wrong thing or saying it in the wrong place; happen every day in the Air Force and probably every security location.

If you do that you can get a range of consequences. Typically you will get yelled at, a verbal reprimand.

Your boss can do more but your security violation reflects badly on him and is his responsibility and he can get in trouble too, so he is not inclined to make a bigger deal than necessary.

If it is a serious compromise where substantial info gets into unauthorized hands (and remember for Sec. Clinton we are not told it went to uncleared personnel, only that it was sent via an insecure system) and your screw-up was big you might get a letter of reprimand, or even non-judicial punishment (you agree to a fine, rank reduction, etc. without trial). Those can be career ending. The exact details will vary and is a commander’s decision normally. If you screwed up big and he has to report it, call in investigators, your career will be ruined. But that’s pretty much it.

In the normal course of events no one gets a court martial who has not intentionally compromised classified material and knowingly disclosed it to an uncleared person. I never saw that happen even once. I saw lots of security violations but I newer saw a court martial for it.

Secretary Clinton got her admonishment, her reprimand. That’s what usually happens.

Posted in Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Strawman Theory and CAPITAL LETTER Theory

Shortlink to this page: http://wp.me/p3nYC8-TB

Background

I am a retired businessman not a lawyer. I have studied the law both formally (graduate level classes on law and international affairs) and independently. This page is part of a series of blogs in which I examine aspects of sovereign citizen theory, which starts at Sovereign Citizens and Fellow Travelers

These are not trifling matters. Adherence to these theories can and does result in fines, imprisonment, seizure of assets. You definitely should not be taking advice from YouTube videos. I have tried to make these blogs as clear and accurate as possible and I include whenever possible links to actual law and court decisions so you can see whether what I say is accurate.

The Strawman Theory & Capitalization of Names Theory

In considering a variety of claims made by sovereign citizens and their fellow freemen on the land and cohorts, several theories need addressing.

The Strawman theory claims that there is a real you, the living person; and because you have a birth certificate or social security card you are a stock market commodity pledged to the benefit of the nation; and/or you have a trust account in a fictitious entity, sometimes called the Person [YOUR NAME IN CAPITALS ] — CAPITALIZATION theory — that is created by those documents. I know that’s hard to follow, and I have had a hard time finding an “official version” of this theory.

Recently I came across an account in a Federal Claims Court decision that seems to be clear enough. This is a description of the “Strawman theory” and “Capitalization theory”; the former is often but not always offered in conjunction with the latter theory.

“The goal of some sovereign citizens is the recovery of money from the United States that they actually–in the form of taxes–or purportedly paid to the government…. As the Honorable Norman K. Moon explained, such claims are premised upon the following beliefs:

“Supposedly, prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, there were no U.S. citizens; instead, people were citizens only of their individual states. Even after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. citizenship remains optional. The federal government, however, has tricked the populace into becoming U.S. citizens by entering into “contracts” embodied in such documents as birth certificates and social security cards. With these contracts, an individual unwittingly creates a fictitious entity (i.e., the U.S. citizen) that represents, but is separate from, the real person. 

“Through these contracts, individuals also unknowingly pledge themselves and their property, through their newly created fictitious entities, as security for the national debt in exchange for the benefits of citizenship. However, the government cannot hold the profits it makes from this use of its citizens and their property in the general fund of the United States because doing so would constitute fraud, given that the profits technically belong to the actual owners of the property being pledged (i.e., the real people represented by the fictitious entities). Therefore, the government holds the profits in secret, individual trust accounts, one for each citizen.

“Because the populace is unaware that their birth certificates and such are actually contracts with the government, these contracts are fraudulent. As a result, the officers of government are liable for treason unless they provide a remedy that allows an individual to recover what she is owed–namely, the profits held in her trust account, which the government has made from its use of her and her property in the commercial markets.

“In 1933, the government provided just such a remedy with House Joint Resolution 192, and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides the means for a person to implement it. The fact that virtually no one is aware of this remedy or how to use it is all part of the government’s scheme–if no one takes advantage of the remedy, the government can keep the money, so it is in the government’s interest that the remedy be obscure.  (Bryant v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d 753 (W.D. Va. 2007) (describing an attempt to satisfy a mortgage). at 758-59 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 758 n.8 (“Further thickening the plot, the name of the fictitious entity is the real person’s name in all-capital letters, which apparently explains why names are commonly written in all-capital letters on birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and other government documents.”)).

“To collect the money held by the United States in the “secret, individual trust accounts,” sovereign citizens employ the process known as “redemption.” In this process, sovereign citizens file one or more UCC financing statements naming themselves as both the secured party and the debtor, with the intent “to register a security interest in the fictitious entity that was created by [their] birth certificate and other government documents….”

“Typically, the secured party’s name is written using only initial capital letters and the debtor’s name is written in all capital letters.”

 Brandon Shane Gravatt v The United States (pdf) (Capitalized in the documents!)
US Court of Claims, No. 11-592C Order of Dismissal, Filed September 27, 2011.
(Gravatt eventually pleaded guilty, to possession of 50 grams or more of “crack” cocaine and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine.)

I should emphasize the above is not a Court agreeing with this theory or promoting it, but summarizing what the theory that person being tried has claimed says; and in fact the court in its Order of Dismissal dismissed these arguments utterly….

Part of the theory here is that — some say harking back to Roman Law — capital letters make a difference when you specify a name.

How ridiculous is the Capitalization theory? Roman Latin had no small letters at all. Everything was capitalized all the time. So how would the use of Capitals make a difference when nothing but Capitals exist?  MARCVS FLAVIVS would agree I am sure.

roman-capitals

At any rate, when you are born, or so they say, the government creates an “account” in your CAPITALIZED name  which is, I guess, CAPITALIZED with millions of dollars in it and you only need some magic words to access this money for your own use. This is not you, it’s your corporate share of America or something….

Someone made this up out of nothing. There is no such account and no money in it.

But many get in serious legal and financial hot water following it (or reach out to it because they are already in financial trouble and end up in worse trouble) … people create official looking documents to ‘access’ this account then give them to someone, say “buys” a car in exchange, and then the seller is stuck with nothing because those papers are not money and can’t be deposited or recognized and will not be paid and can’t be spent… and the sovereign who did it may well end up in jail, at least in court, for forgery or fraud.

Others just say that’s not me, I am not the corporate fiction or juridical person and am instead the natural person or the freeman…thus nothing in law applies to them, especially if it is capitalized. Like the indictment or arrest warrant. Guess what?

The police do not agree.

The Courts Do Not Agree Either

Generally the courts have held that these arguments “lack merit; are wholly baseless; lack an arguable basis in either law or in fact; are completely without merit; and specious”

… the defendant contends that the Indictment must be dismissed because “KURT WASHINGTON,” spelled out in capital letters, is a fictitious name used by the Government to tax him improperly as a business, and that the correct spelling and presentation of his name is “Kurt Washington.” This contention is baseless.
United States v. Washington, 947 F. Supp. 87, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

“The core of defendant’s argument on appeal is that (1) he was born Donald James Drew, and the person charged in this matter was DONALD JAMES DREW; (2) the capitalization of the name created a “Strawman/Stramineous Homo/Ens Legis/ Artificial Person” (artificial person); (3) the artificial person was convicted; (4) he has been incarcerated as surety chattel or security for the artificial person; and (5) he has been denied due process.

“Claims so premised are patently frivolous and without merit.”
People v Drew, Colorado Court of Appeals

Petitioner seeks to quash the summons for a number of reasons. He claims that the summons was issued without lawful authority, that the “Summons form lists Petitioner’s name in caps, utilizing the Alter-Ego, Doctrine of Mortmain, to which Petitioner is not subject”, that section 7602 “does not have authorizing federal regulations to enforce compliance,” the summons itself was a sham and a fraud, the summons is not relevant to a legitimate purpose, and the data sought is already in Respondent’s possession.

The Petitioner raised nearly all of the same arguments in the matter Russell v. United States, (No. 1:94-CV-672) 1994 WL 750673 (W.D.Mich.1994). In that opinion, this Court found that Petitioner’s arguments, “lack merit”, are “wholly baseless”, and “lack an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” This Court finds that its conclusions as to the merit of Petitioner’s arguments have not changed since the above opinion was issued.

Petitioner has raised one new argument in that he claims because his name is in all capital letters on the summons, he is not subject to the summons. As to this argument, this Court will follow the Eighth Circuit when it responded to an argument of similar merit when it stated “[t]hese issues are completely without merit, patently frivolous, and will be rejected without expending any more of this Court’s resources on their discussion.”      United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir.1992)
Russel v United States 969 F. Supp. 24, 25 (W.D. Mich. 1997)

…Jaeger asserts that “All capital letters changes the status of an individual significantly, as it creates a  corporate`person’ (which plaintiff is not) and changes the status of an individual (which plaintiff has not authorized). See Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. at 191.”

The court does not believe that the cited authority supports Jaeger’s proposition, because the definitions found on the cited page of Black’s Law Dictionary have to do with the financial basis of a corporation, not the way in which names are written.

The court finds Jaeger’s arguments concerning capitalization otherwise specious. The court routinely capitalizes the names of all parties before this court in all matters, civil and criminal, without any regard to their corporate or individual status...Jaeger’s motions to strike are denied..
Jaeger v. Dubuque County, 880 F. Supp. 640, 643 (N.D. Iowa 1995)

Rejected criminal defendant’s contention that he was not properly identified in federal government documents that misspelled his name or used his properly spelled name in all capital letters.
United States v. Furman, 168 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D. La. 2001)

“Wright brings what he has labeled a ‘motion to dismiss for plaintiff’s lack of standing and misjoinder of parties.’ First, he contends that since the amended complaint states that this action is brought against ‘FLOYD A. WRIGHT’ and his name is ‘Floyd A. Wright’, he is not the proper defendant. … These arguments are patently frivolous and the motion is thus summarily DENIED.”
United States v. Wright, 83 A.F.T.R.2d 99-533, KTC 1998-630, No. S-94-1183 (U.S.D.C. E.D.Cal. 1998)

It is also rejected by courts in other countries that base their legal system on English common law. You can find an analysis refuting this and other common “freeman/sovereign” arguments in the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta decision Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, at http://canlii.ca/t/fsvjq

That is what the Courts say when this theory is offered to support a legal position, they call it frivolous and meritless and say it “lacks merit; are wholly baseless; lack an arguable basis in either law or in fact; are completely without merit; and specious.”

So that is how the courts see these arguments. And sometimes they fine people for making them. And if you try to get the mythical “money” in the mythical “name account” you may get a not so mythical prison term for fraud.

And again, even if you decide that’s unconstitutional, the Courts have the power to make it quite constitutional for their purposes, and you must bear the consequences if you fail to accept their determinations.

It is agreed that ideas can be powerful, but what power is there in a theory no court will accept or enforce; and the vast majority of people think is wrong? If enough people believed it then those people could create a new government though you can’t actually govern sovereign individuals…so it really is impossible.

=                                       More Blogs by Philipem 1000                                       =

Sovereign Citizens and Fellow Travelers
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fD
=                                                          The Law                                                          =
Sources Of Law and Authority
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fF

Are Statutes Laws?  What About Regulations ?
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-Od

Strawman Theory and CAPITAL Letters
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-TB

A collection of court cases
  quoted regularly in response to sovereign citizen
ideas and challenges to the driver license laws

=                                                  The US and the States                                                =

Do You Need a License to Drive ?
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-mI
The United States Is A Corporation
(Or If You Prefer, It Can Be An Elephant )
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fK
The US Became Bankrupt in 1933 &
Federal Reserve Notes are Not Legal Currency
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fO

The United States is still a British Colony
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-kz

There are Three United States
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fX

=                                                 The Courts                                                     =

A Lost 13th Amendment
Removes all Legitimacy from Courts
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-kI
All US Courts hear only Admiralty Cases
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fV

US Courts are not Admiralty after all,
but instead Equity Courts

http://wp.me/p3nYC8-l2

US Courts are Administrative, Not Judicial
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-fR

All Lawyers take a Secret Oath to Hide ‘The TRUTH
http://wp.me/p3nYC8-l2

Posted in Sovereign Citizen Crackpot Theories | 2 Comments